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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
The dissertation consists of three essays that analyze relative growth of subsidiary 
farming and a decline in the production of collective farms in post-Soviet Ukraine. The first 
two essays consider the change in the production shares of the collective and subsidiary 
sectors as two interrelated phenomena. The analysis is built on the observation that all the 
employees of the collective farms have access to subsidiary plots. We analyze whether a 
shift of labor from collective farming towards subsidiary farming may be explained by a 
rational reaction of households to income uncertainty (the first essay) and to a decline in 
wages and increased land availability (the second essay). The third essay identifies human 
capital and farm organization factors that slowed the decline in production at some 
collective farms compared with others at the early stages of reforms. 
As illustrated below, the process of economic reforms in Ukrainian agriculture is far 
from complete. Land reform has led to transfer of state land to collective and private 
ownership, but internal farm restructuring has hardly begun. Collective forms of 
organization continue to dominate agriculture in Ukraine, Russia, Byelorussia, and in some 
other former Soviet Union countries. Former collective farms control most of the land and 
remain major employers in rural areas. Yet, subsidiary private agriculmre has grown 
sharply in many post-Soviet countries since the beginning of economic reforms in the early 
1990s. It represented nearly a half of gross agricultural output in Russia and Ukraine by 
1997, up from approximately a quarter of gross agricultural output in the Soviet Union in 
1990 (World Bank, 1994). However, in contrast, the share of gross agricultural land under 
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the subsidiary plots increased from approximately 8 percent to only 12-15 percent during the 
same period. 
Because of the growth in relative importance of output from subsidiary private 
agriculture, analysis of the changes in economic activity of the collective farms and their 
employees may help in understanding of the current trends in post-Soviet agricultural 
production. A better understanding of the economic motives behind the observed 
phenomena may in turn help in the development of new agricultural policies aimed at 
speeding up the process of reforms. 
The following questions are addressed in the three essays. 
1) Can the growth of the subsidiary household plot share in the gross agricultural output be 
explained, in part, by a rational shift of labor from wage work to subsidiary farming in 
response to uncertainty in wage income? Similarly, can increased involvement of 
pensioners in subsidiary farming be a rational reaction to uncertainty in pensions? 
2) Can a decline in real wages cause shift of labor from wage work to subsidiary work? Do 
official statistics support the hypothesized shift of labor from wage work to subsidiary 
farming? 
3) What factors determine the success in collective farm adaptation to the changing 
economic conditions during the transition from planned economy toward the market 
oriented one? Why do some collective farms perform better than others do? 
The first essay is a theoretical analysis of the effects of uncertainty in income on 
labor allocation decisions of households that have access to subsidiary plots. An agriculmral 
household model with wage uncertainty is used for the analysis. 
3 
The second essay combines the theoretical approach of the agricultural household 
model with empirical evidence to smdy redistribution of labor between wage work and 
subsidiary farming in response to a decline in wages. An increase in the share of the gross 
agricultural output produced at the subsidiary plots is estimated as a function of changes in 
labor, land, and other input application using official region-level Ukrainian data. 
In the third essay, we estimate a frontier production function, examine the changes in 
technical efficiency at the earliest stages of economic reforms, and evaluate the relationship 
between technical efficiency and farm workforce composition using Ukrainian farm-level 
survey data. 
The dissertation is organized as follows. The rest of the Introduction details the 
current state of economic reforms in the Ukrainian agriculture. Chapters 2 through 4 
describe the three studies conducted. Each of the three chapters starts with the research 
question, followed by the justification of the study, literature review, presentation of models 
used, and results. The chapters conclude with discussion and interpretation of findings. 
Lengthy mathematical proofs are collected in the Appendix. 
Purpose and scope of economic reforms in agriculture 
Creation of a market-oriented privatized agriculture is an important component of 
overall economic reforms started in Ukraine in the early 1990s. Unlike for western 
industrialized countries, Ukraine's agricultural sector traditionally accounted for a 
prominent share of aggregate output and employment. In 1992, primary agriculture 
contributed 19% to the Ukrainian net material product, and employed about 20% of the 
labor force (World Bank, 1994). Because of its importance, agriculmre has often been 
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considered as an engine that can drive the process of reforms in Ukraine (Csaki and Lerman, 
1997). 
The ultimate goal of the reforms in agriculture is transformation of the agricultural 
sector into an efficient and productive system based on private ownership and individual 
incentives. 
In order to achieve this goal, several directions of the reforms have been 
recommended. Several categorizations of the directions are possible, including the 
following one by World Bank analysts (World Bank, 1994; Csaki and Lerman, 1997; 
Sedik, Truebold, and Amade, 1999): 
1) Creation of a new macroeconomic framework for agriculture, including 
a) liberalization of prices and markets for farm products and inputs, and 
b) opening the economy for foreign trade. 
2) Land reform, including 
a) privatization of land and 
b) restructuring of traditional socialist farming units into operations consistent with 
market principles; and 
3) Setting up of a competitive market environment, including 
a) privatization and demonopolization of agro-processing, input supply, services, 
trade, and financial system, 
b) establishment of a legal system capable of enforcing contracts, and 
c) elimination of subsidies for collective production and restrictions on private 
production. 
I 
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Only the recommendation on land reform is specific to agriculture. The other two 
domains of reform relate to the general economy and focus on "upstream " and 
"downstream" areas of the agricultural sector. 
However, all three levels of the reform are inter-related, and progress on one of the 
issues can not compensate for failure to move forward in the other ones. Yet up to this date, 
the reforms are far from being complete in any of these directions. Contemporary Ukrainian 
agriculture is in the stage of transition with elements of both the old command and the new 
market system at work. The next sections highlight some of the achievements and failures 
in the reform progress. 
Worsening agricultural terms of trade 
The overall economic reforms started in Ukraine with limited price liberation and 
introduction of private property. Prices for purchased inputs grew much faster than farm 
gate prices for agricultural products that were still controlled by the Govemment (UIAE, 
1996; Pogozheva and Chenard, 1997; Van Atta et al., 1998) (Fig. 1.1). In Ukraine, the 
price of fuel increased more than 300,000 times, the price of fertilizers and chemicals more 
than 100,000 times, and machinery prices grew more than 60,000 times between 1991 and 
1995. The price of grain, however, rose "only" 22,000 times and the price of sugar beets 
increased less than 40,000 times over the same period (Csaki and Lerman, 1997). 
These changes have resulted in inadequate input applications and contributed to 
declining output levels (Pogozheva and Chenard, 1997; Sedik, Truebold, and Amade, 1999) 
and farm incomes (Kakwani, 1996). Decreased farm income in the presence of high 
nominal interest rates, in turn, contributed to reduced farm investment. By 1996, Ukrainian 
agricultural input prices 
farm gate prices 
ON 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Figure 1.1. Ukraine: Agricultural input and output price indices; 1990=1 
Source: OECD, 1998 
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GDP dropped to 43% of its 1990 level, and gross agricultural product dropped to 59% of the 
1990 level (Csaki and Lerman, 1997). Standard measures of agricultural productivity, i.e., 
output per worker, crop yields, milk per cow, and animal slaughter weights, clearly 
deteriorated (ibid.). Although areas sown to crops have decreased since 1990 by only 5%, 
the production of main cash crops, cereals and sugar beets dropped by 30% - 40% between 
1990 and 1995. 
The Government of Ukraine used short-term adjustment policies to stabilize farm 
income and food production. Agricultural producers were provided with compensation 
payments (UIAE, 1996) and farm inputs in exchange for sales of production to the state 
(Pogozheva and Chenard, 1997; Van Atta et al., 1998). Yet, most of the collective sector 
farms have been unprofitable since 1996 (SCSU, 1997). Some 92% of Ukrainian farms 
reported losses in 1998 (RFE/RL, 1999). 
Collective enterprises continue to bear little responsibility for the financial results of 
their operations. Debts continue to be postponed and written off: in 1998, Ukrainian 
President Kuchma signed a decree postponing payment of huge debts to the state which 
collective and state agricultural producers incurred since 1992 (EEAF, 1998). In June of 
1999, collective farms owed the state around 3 million tons of grain (roughly 10% of the 
yearly Ukrainian harvest) for inputs provided in 1997-1998; in 1998, the state wrote off 
debts worth 4 million tons of grain for 1994-1996 (Survey of the Press, 1999). 
Decline and uncertainty in incomes 
Wages have always been the primary source of income in Ukraine: in 1995, 70% of 
Ukraine's population lived on an official salary received firom state organizations (World 
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Bank, 1996). Real wages have declined rapidly in all sectors of the economy since the 
beginning of reforms in the early 1990s (Fig. 1.2). Furthermore, wage arrears and 
deferments in government-provided social benefits lasting for several months became 
systematic in Ukraine (Fig. 1.3). 
The wage situation in collective agriculture is not different from the rest of the 
economy. The real average wage accrued in agriculture in 1996 was merely 27% of that in 
1991 (SCSU, 1997). 
According to a random survey of some 1600 employees of the collective sector in 
agriculture conducted by the World Bank, some 77% of the respondents experienced payroll 
arrears in 1995. Among them, one fourth reported 7 to 12 months with irregular salary 
payments in 1995 (Csaki and Lerman, 1997). 
By the end of 1998, virtually all of the 3 million employees of former collective and 
state farms were affected by wage arrears with an average delay in wage payments of 7.6 
months per employee (MAPCU, 1999). Farm-level surveys provide similar data: Perotta 
(1999b) found that none of the 959 respondents of a survey of Ukrainian farm employees 
reported timely paid wages. Some 47% of the respondents were not paid more than six 
months of wages at the end of 1998, and 13% had not been paid cash wages for two years or 
more. Not surprisingly, the sale of surplus ft^om subsidiary farming was often claimed to be 
the main or only source of cash for rural residents in this survey. 
300 
-D-Average real wage in the collective 
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Figure 1.2. Ukraine: real wages per month; 1990 Krb. 
Sources: MSU, 1992, 1996; World Bank, 1996; SCSU, 1997; 
Ukrainian Economic Trends, 1998; MAPCU, 1999. 
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Figure 1.3. Ukraine: Wage and pension arrears; mln. 1990 Krb. 
Source: Ukrainian Economics Trends, 1998 
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Institutional structure of primary agriculture 
Inherited institutional structure 
The collective farming system was an integral part of Ukraine's centrally planned 
national economy. It consisted mainly of two centrally controlled types of large-scale 
farms: collective and state. Output and all assets of the collective farms were owned joindy 
by their members, whereas those of the state farms were owned by the state. The 
differences, however, were practically eliminated after World War n with the adoption of 
guaranteed wages for the collective farm members and provision of credit, much of which 
was later written off. In 1992, there were 9,080 collective and 2,643 state farms in Ukraine. 
On average, they employed 355 and 439 workers, and had 2,731 and 3,254 hectares of 
farmland, respectively (World Bank, 1994). The well being of the farms depended not on 
financial results of production, but on how well the centrally planned production targets 
were met. 
The private sector consisted of so-called subsidiary household plots (SHP) of the 
state and collective farm members and gardens and vegetable plots allocated to urban 
citizens. In the second half of the 1980s an estimated 2.8 million families used 2.7 million 
hectares (6.2% of the total Ukrainian arable land) to produce 30% of livestock and 20% of 
the gross agriculmral production in Ukraine (World Bank, 1994). However, the relatively 
high productivity of private agriculture is likely to be overestimated, as the household plots' 
production was intensively supported by the large scale state and collective farms through 
provision of critical inputs (fertilizer, seeds, farm machinery and transport, feed, pastures, 
etc.), often free of charge. Large industrial enterprises often subsidized their workers' 
gardens and vegetables plots production through provision of transportatioa and purchase of 
some production inputs at subsidized prices. The creation of independent family farms did 
not start until 1990. 
Land reform 
Csaki and Lerman (1997) and Lerman, Brooks, and Csaki (1994) provide useful 
information on Ukraine's land reform. 
Before the reforms started, agricultural land was 100 percent state owned, and the 
Soviet system recognized user rights to the state-owned land only. Legislation adopted in 
1990-92 recognized three forms of land ownership: state, collective, and private. 
Exclusively state ownership remained for a reasonably restricted list of lands, while all other 
lands became transferable to collective and private ownership. Collective ownership is a 
transitional form from state to private ownership. The land under gardens and vegetable 
plots of urban citizens and under SHP became private ownership directly. The transfer of 
land from the state to collective and private ownership is free except for private farmers, 
who must pay the state for any land in excess of the average land share as calculated on a 
per-capita basis for each district. 
Under the new laws, all citizens of Ukraine are entitled to own land. However, the 
current Land Code establishes severe restrictions on transactions, use, and the size of the 
privately owned land. The restrictions include a six-year moratorium on selling of privately 
owned land (still in place as of July 1999), prohibition of leasing out the land for more than 
5 years in duration, and mandatory continuous use of land for farming. Legitimate non-
farming uses include construction of "dachas" (second homes in rural areas), and garage or 
storage spaces. If any of these conditions is violated, the private land is taken away by local 
authorities. 
The size of the privately owned land unit is restricted to not exceed 50 ha in a private 
farm, 0.6 ha in a SHP, and 0.25 ha for residential construction in rural areas. Urban 
residents are allowed to own up to 0.12 ha under a garden plot, up to 0.01 ha under a garage 
plot, and no more than 0.1 ha for a "dacha" (Lerman, Brooks, and Csaki, 1994). 
The pool of land available for distribution into private ownership was set up through 
creation of a state land reserve and special reserve. 
Collective and state farms had to extract up to 10% of their land for the state reserve. 
The reserve is a source of land for new users, who are not members or employees of existing 
farm enterprises ("outsiders"). Reserve land that has not been actually allocated to 
individuals remains in temporary use by the collective or state farm. However, as of 1996, 
individuals had received only 50% of the total reserve of 6.2 million hectares. 
"Insiders", i.e. members or employees of existing farm enterprises received land for 
SHP augmentation from a special reserve created by extracting an additional 15% of the 
remaining land in collective and state farms. 
The land remaining after the extraction transfers to collective ownership. Most of 
the collectively owned land is to be distributed among the members of the collective, 
including social sphere workers and pensioners residing in the village. The collective land is 
divided through calculation of land shares in the form of individual certificates of 
entitlement. 
The land share represents the right of an individual to private ownership of a plot of 
land without physical demarcation of that plot in the field or even on a map. The land shares 
14 
are more tradable than actual land plots, at least on paper. However, according to a World 
Bank survey, the determination of land shares practically began in 1995, and only half of 
former state and collective farms had calculated land shares as of February 1996 (Csaki and 
Lerman, 1997). 
The 1990-92 legislation states that every individual is free to leave the collective 
with a physical plot of land, and the private ownership then will be certified by an official 
tide. Yet as of 1997, most of the land in Ukraine is in collective, and not private, ownership: 
privately owned land accounted for 15%, and collectively owned for 65% of the total 
country's land (Csaki and Lerman, 1997). 
The first laws of land reform provided a legal basis for the expansion of private 
sector in Ukrainian agriculture. Private farms could now be created with land coming from 
the land shares and SHP of former collective farm members and state farm workers, and the 
land from the state reserve. In addition, land could be purchased from the state and leased 
from both state and non-state entities. However, lack of a functioning land market has 
hampered the development of a rural finance market, which, in turn, has limited further 
development of private agriculture. 
Contemporary institutional structure 
By 1997, because of the reforms, the number of SHP increased to 12 million, and 
nearly 35,000 private family farms emerged. However, today, the share of individual use of 
land in the Ukrainian agriculture is still very small, as the newly created private farms 
together with the SHP account for only 15% of agricultural land (Csaki and Lerman, 1997) 
(Fig. 1.4). Some 65% of the land is in collective use, and 17% of the land is in state farms. 
0% 
1989 
• Collective Farms 
• Subsidiary Plots 
• Private Farms 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Figure 1.4. Ukraine: Agricultural land by users; percent of total 
Source: SCSU, 1997 
16 
The transfer of state land to collective ownership was the first step in the 
reorganization of former state and collective farms. The other steps are computation of land 
and asset shares, distribution of physical assets according to the shares, and, ultimately, 
internal reorganization of farms into enterprises based on private ownership and individual 
incentives. By 1997, some 80% of the collective and state farms reorganized into collective 
agricultural enterprises, farmers' unions, associations, cooperatives, partnerships, joint-stock 
societies, and state farms. Despite this diversity, the reorganization of the collective farming 
system in Ukraine (and in Russia) has been purely formal so far, as most of these farms 
reorganized into the new legal form of collective farm enterprise without any internal 
reorganization. Hereafter, we will refer to aU the collective sector farms as to coUectivist 
farms. 
In addition to the land shares, division of farm assets by asset shares was determined 
at 74% of coUectivist farms (Csaki and Lerman, 1997) by 1996. Where the land and assets 
shares were computed, most of the sharing process beneficiaries "invested" their shares into 
the coUectivist farm thus becoming shareholders of a new corporate entity. However, the 
new farm organizational forms have not induced reallocation of resources, such as land, 
assets, and labor to market-oriented sub-units. Sedik, Foster, and Liefert (1996) report that 
in 1993 no changes occurred in large farm management practice. According to a World 
Bank survey, in 1996, 86% former state and collective farms preserved central management 
responsible for overall production planning. In addition, more than 80% of farm managers 
continued to endorse a lifetime employment policy for farm members. New units of the 
reorganized farms were allocated mostly the land and assets they had held under the old 
balance sheets (Csaki and Lerman, 1997). 
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Social responsibilities of collectivist farms 
During the Soviet times, the state and collective farms not only produced agricultural 
output, but also provided most of the social and municipal services for the communities 
where they were located (World Bank, 1994; Sedik, Foster, and Liefert, 1996; Csaki and 
Lerman, 1997). Social assets, like central heating and water supply, local roads and lighting, 
child care and recreational facilities, public catering were actually built, operated, and 
financed by farm enterprises from their operating profits. While schools and medical 
services were state provided, the farms participated actively in their repair and provided 
their staff with housing and SHPs. The collectivist farms rendered social services and 
benefits, like products at subsidized prices and production support for their household plots, 
both for the farm employees and for other rural workers. As part of the reorganization 
process, the farms were expected to transfer their traditional responsibilities for social assets 
and provision of rural social services to local municipal councils. 
However, according to World Bank surveys conducted in 1993/94 and 1995/96, the 
farms remain the primary providers of these services (Csaki and Lerman, 1997). Lerman, 
Brooks, and Csaki (1994) suggest that potential loss of farm-provided social benefits was 
considered as one of the main reasons for the decision of farm employees to remain on the 
collectivist farm. Local authorities could not afford to have these services on their accounts, 
whereas for the farm enterprises the cost of maintaining social infrastructure was relatively 
low. According to the 1993/94 survey, social infrastructure expenditures constituted 8.5% 
of total farm expendimres on average, and about 3% of the total farm labor force were social 
workers (Lerman, Brooks, and Csaki, 1994). The last number remained the same in 1996 
(Csaki and Lerman, 1997). 
f 
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Farm non-agricultural productive activities 
Besides social services provision the coUectivist farms often did their own building 
construction, machinery maintenance, and processing, and, in this way, have participated in 
the food industry vertical integration process (ILO, 1995). According to the 1993/94 World 
Bank survey, 12% of farm labor had non-agricultural occupations in 1993, such as 
processing, construction, and repairs (Lerman, Brooks, and Csaki, 1994). A survey 
conducted by the Ukrainian Institute of Agrarian Economics did not differentiate between 
social services and other non-agricultural occupations but provides similar total numbers. 
Some 14% of workers did not work directly in agricultural activities and 11% of farm total 
costs were not associated with agricultural activities on average in 1989-1992 years. 
The involvement of coUectivist farms in social services provision and non-
agricultural activities made them, in practice, the exclusive employers in rural areas. The 
slow progress in restructuring of coUectivist farms means then that there are stUl very 
limited employment opportunities in rural areas outside of the coUective sector. 
Role of subsidiary household plots (SHP) 
The private sector of Ukrainian agriculture consists of the SHP of coUectivist farm 
employees, gardens and vegetable plots of urban citizens, and officially registered private 
family farms. 
Difference between SHP and officially registered private farms 
The difference between the officially registered private family farms and the rest of 
the private sector is that the latter are worked part-time by people otherwise employed 
somewhere else or by those previously employed and now retired. The officially registered 
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private farmers, in contrast, run their farms full-time. As Lerman, Brooks, and Csaki (1994, 
p. 10) put it, "Private farmers produce for markets and consume a residual, unlike household 
subsidiary producers, who produce for their own use and market a residual." 
Specialization and size reflect the difference. The average private farm was 23.6 
hectares in 1997 <SCSU, 1997), while the average SHP was 0.5 hectares (Csaki and Lerman, 
1997). Being smaller, the SHPs produce predominantly fruits, vegetables, and livestock 
products; much of the production is for subsistence (Valdes et al., 1997). The large private 
farms specialize in grains, sugar beets, and sunflower production (Csaki and Lerman, 1997). 
Another dimension differentiating the two types of farms is that unlike the officially 
registered private farm production, the SHP production is tax-free. 
Share of SHP in gross agricultural product 
In 1980, in the USSR, the share of non-social economy in grain was estimated to be 
1%, and that for sunflower seeds 2%, meat 31%, milk 30%, eggs 32%, wool 21%, 
vegetables 33%, and potatoes 64% (Omirova, 1983). In 1991, private household plot 
production occupied 10% of the Ukrainian agricultural land, and contributed 26% of total 
crop production and 34% to total livestock production. By 1996, the shares grew to 14, 49, 
and 56%, respectively (Fig. 1.5). The household plots accounted for 95 % of the country's 
potato production, 82 % of total vegetable production, and 74 % of Ukrainian fmit crop in 
1996 (SCSU, 1997). 
Extent of citizens' involvement into household production 
The degree of citizen's involvement in household plot production is large for such an 
industrialized country as Ukraine; according to International Labor Office calculations 
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Figure 1,5. Ukraine: agricultural production; million 1983 Krb. 
Source: Adapted from Csaki and Lerman, 1997 
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(BLO, 1995), urban residents possessed some 6.8 million private plots in 1993. That means 
that every second urban family was growing fruits, vegetables, and potatoes on the plots 
averaging 600 square meters. According to the official Ukrainian statistics, some 11 million 
people owned and worked subsidiary plots in 1996 (SCSU, 1997), i.e. approximately every 
fifth Ukrainian citizen is involved in subsidiary agricultural production. These numbers 
reflect the under-development of both labor and food markets as labor has no better 
opportunities than to work land to secure subsistent levels of food consumption. 
Household plots as a source of income 
Household plot production is an important source of income for people of Ukraine 
(Brainerd, 1995; Johnson, Kauffman, and Ustemko, 1996). Family Budget Surveys (FBS) 
reveal that the household plots provide a sizable share of collectivist farm employee income. 
The FBS were conducted in USSR annually and their aggregated results became first 
available to the public in the late 1980s. Both members of collective farms and state farm 
employees were represented in the surveys though in different sub-surveys. The state farm 
employees were combined with state employees in other sectors, while the collective farm 
member households were represented in a separate sub-survey.' 
According to the FBS, state sector employees derived from 2.3% to 2.5% of their 
income from subsidiary plot production (MSUSSR, 1991). Because of the inclusion of rural 
'FBS design had several shortcomings (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992). Exclusion of families of 
those employed in cooperative or private sectors and those not employed, over-representation of families with 
more than one member working in the state sector, and bias of the sample toward families of elder persons 
with longer working history are the most known ones. Pensioners are believed to be under-represented as 
some are included in state employee or collective farm member samples according to their previous 
employment (ibid.). Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the FBS are a valuable source of information on the 
importance of private household plots in total income of collectivist farm workers and the farm retirees. 
state enterprise employees into one category with the urban ones, these numbers obviously 
underestimate this share for state farm employees while overstating the share for the urban 
workers. 
An estimated 25.3% of collective farm member family income was derived from 
SHP in 1980 in USSR (Omirova, 1983). For Ukraine, the share was above the USSR 
average. The FBS show that 28 to 30 percent of the collective farm worker families' income 
came from subsidiary plot production in the period 1980-1990 (MSUSSR, 1991). These 
numbers might be under-estimated as well, as the SHP production that was consumed was 
valued at state prices as opposed to the marketed SHP production valued at the actual sale 
prices. While some share of the private household production was sold through the 
collectivist farm at state prices, another part was sold at the collective farm market at 
considerably higher prices. 
According to surveys conducted by the World Bank, the sales from household plots 
provided 20% of total cash income of average collectivist farm worker families in 1996 
(Csaki and Lerman, 1997). The authors observe also that household plot production is the 
only supplementary source of income for rural employees working full time on collectivist 
farms, as there are no other jobs in villages. 
Cultivation of personal plots of land became the only job for a majority of workers 
who were fired and retired, especially in rural areas (Lazarenko and Zvihlianych, 1996). 
According to the authors, the number of individuals cultivating individual plots for income 
has increased by 500,000 annually since 1990. According to the FBS, the SHP income 
constituted 12 to 18 percent of state enterprise pensioner income, and 42 to 52 percent of the 
income of those who previously worked at collective farms in 1980s (MSUSSR, 1991). 
23 
Household plots as a source of food 
The cash income share does not capture the much larger importance of the plots for 
the population. The state supported the SHP because they provided scarce food, especially 
in rural areas, to protect the population from food shortages. For some products, the 
majority of the food staples used by peasant families came from SHP in the 1970s (Shmelev, 
1979). 
Based on data from the World Bank surveys (1993/94 and 1995/96), about 90% of 
rural faniilies identify the household plot as a channel of food supply. Most crops produced 
are consumed, while 80% of beef, 40% of pork, and 20% of milk produced are sold (Csaki 
andLerman, 1997). 
The private subsidiary production plays a similarly important role in Russian 
agriculture. The share of these forms of production in Russia's gross agricultural is similar 
to that of Ukraine: 44% of gross agricultural product, 90% of potato, 73% of vegetable, and 
77% of total fruit and berry production in 1995. Some 44 million households out of total 50 
million Russian households are involved in this production; 38 million families own SHPs 
(rural households) or gardens and vegetable plots (urban citizens) (Shmelev, 1996). 
In sum, the sector of private household plots plays a prominent role in providing both 
income and supply of agricultural products in Ukraine during the transition period when 
both labor and agricultural production markets are under-developed. 
I 
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2. EFFECT OF INCOME UNCERTAINTY ON SHP LABOR SUPPLY 
Private subsistence agriculture always coexisted with collectivized agriculture in the 
former Soviet Union. Both rural and urban households worked relatively small plots of land 
for supplementary food and income. Although the land remained state property, the rights 
to work plots were inheritable and plot output belonged to producers. The producer 
households mostly consumed the production with any surplus sold either at farmers' markets 
or through state channels. 
The studies presented in this and the next chapters of the dissertation seek to show 
both theoretically and empirically that the growth of subsidiary subsistence farming is 
consistent with other phenomena of transitional economies. The current chapter investigates 
the effect of uncertain real wages and pensions on labor supply decisions of the households 
that have access to subsidiary plots. The next chapter returns to the certainty case to study 
the effect of the decline in wages and increased availability of land for the private use on the 
labor supply decisions. 
Intuitively, when an individual has two sources of income, wage work and subsidiary 
farming, uncertainty in the wage should force risk averse agents to increase their effort in 
the relatively safe income-generating activity, subsidiary household production. Therefore, 
at least a part of the growth in subsidiary agriculture productivity may be explained by the 
decreasing probability of timely payment of wages that causes increased supply of labor to 
the subsidiary farming. The current chapter includes discussion of the theoretical 
foundations for this conjecture and a related research question that has received little 
attention in the literature: the effect of wage uncertainty on agricultural labor supply. 
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An agricultural household model (AHM) is used to analyze the effects of several 
transition economy phenomena on the allocation of labor in agricultural production, 
specifically the share of SHP labor in total labor supply. The dual nature of the AHM, when 
production decisions are combined with consumption decisions, imposes certain 
methodological difficulty under the assumption of uncertainty. 
In the case of certainty, under reasonable assumptions, AHM displays a property of 
recursiveness. Recursiveness refers to the fact that the decisions made by an agricultural 
household could be modeled as being made in two steps (Strauss, 1986). First, the 
household makes a decision on production as a purely competitive firm. Next, consumption 
decisions are made given the income from the first step. In contrast, when wage is random, 
the recursiveness is no longer preserved, and this makes the analysis of the uncertainty case 
more challenging. 
As a price of labor inputs going into subsidiary plot production, wage affects the 
SHP production decision. For a purely competitive firm, the randomness of a price of an 
input lowers the amount of an input used in production if a producer is risk averse 
(Tumovsky, 1969). However, since the household is also the supplier of the labor input, the 
wage affects its income as well. In general, income uncertainty under very reasonable 
assumptions has been shown to increase labor force participation (Block and Heineke, 
1973). Thus, even without taking into account the consumption part of the decisions, when 
considered separately, two opposite effects make the overall uncertainty effect of wages on 
SHP labor hours ambiguous. 
As a price of leisure, wage affects the leisure-consumption decision. As a price of 
household time endowment, wage affects the full income of the household. In the case of a 
generic labor supply model, when no fanning opportunity is assumed, wage uncertainty has 
been shown to have two effects on labor supply (e.g. Block and Heineke, 1973; Kim, 1994; 
Horowitz, 1994). The uncertain price of time endowment produces an 'uncertainty income 
effect' (Block and Heineke, 1973, p.383) that forces a risk averse individual to increase 
his/her productive efforts, i.e. labor supply, in response to uncertain income. However, 
since the agent can reduce uncertainty by substituting away from the activity, an 
'uncertainty substitution effect' (ibid.) suggests lowering involvement in the activity 
affected by uncertainty, i.e. wage work. The two opposite effects make the overall effect of 
uncertainty in wages on the labor supply ambiguous. 
Although ? generic labor supply model predicts an ambiguous effect of wage 
uncertainty on labor supply, considering the labor supply decision as a part of larger model 
may help obtain definite results. As an example, Ormiston and Schlee (1994) showed that 
if workers are risk averse, then aggregate hours of work are lowered in a long-run 
competitive equilibrium in the labor market. In our case, the existence of two aspects of the 
labor supply, SHP work and wage work, makes signing the effects of uncertainty for wage 
earning households possible. 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, a review of previous research is 
presented, followed by a presentation and discussion of the model used. Changes affecting 
households with wage earners are considered: a decline in real wages, an increase of SHP 
area, uncertainty in real wages, and a decline in the probability of receiving wages. Next, an 
AHM model with absent labor markets provides the basis for analyzing changes affecting 
pensioners: a decline in real pensions, an increase in land plots, uncertainty in pensions, and 
an increase in uncertainty of pension income. The increase in uncertainty is modeled as a 
mean-preserving spread in the distribution of pensions. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the obtained results. 
Previous research 
To model the effects of income changes and income uncertainty on SHP labor 
supply, the framework of the neo-classical agricultural household model (AHM) is the most 
natural choice. The model, as presented, for example, in Singh, Squire, and Strauss (1986), 
has been used extensively to smdy economic behavior of peasant households, where the 
peasant households are defined as those facing both consumption and agricultural 
production decisions. The basic model assumes a utility maximizing, price-taking agent that 
makes consumption choices simultaneously with the time allocation choice between farm 
work, off-farm employment, and leisure. 
The AHM has become a widely used tool to study collective farm worker behavior. 
Similar to the neoclassical AHM, a collective farm member allocates his/her time between 
three alternatives: collective farm work, subsidiary household plot work, and leisure. The 
institution of collective farming imposes two constraints in a generic AHM. Firstly, 
households can sell labor to the collectivist farm, but can not hire any labor for the SHP. 
Secondly, households must sell some of their labor to the collectivist farm in order to have 
the right to work the subsidiary plot. With these constraints, an AHM applied to collective 
farming in the (post-) Soviet economy stands in between the basic AHM and the AHM with 
completely absent labor markets discussed by Strauss (1986). 
The collective farmer model has been applied in two settings: as a producer 
cooperative model (Bradley, 1971, 1973; Cameron, 1973a,b; Ireland and Law, 1980; and 
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Bonin, 1977) and as a wage based model (Chandler, 1984). The difference between the two 
versions is in modeling the collectivist farm income. In the producer cooperative model, a 
system of shared residual wages is assumed, by which the income of a collective member 
from collective production is determined residually as the collective accounting profit per 
member. This system has been changing since the mid-1960s toward one of guaranteed 
wages, and was completely abolished in the late 1970s. State farm workers always received 
fixed wages (World Bank, 1994). The wage version of the collective farm applications of 
the AHM models the member's income from collective production more realistically by 
assuming that the remuneration is a fixed wage times hours of work. 
The models of collectivist farm household labor supply have been applied 
predominantly in deterministic settings (Bradley, 1971; Cameron, 1973a; Ireland and Law, 
1980; Chandler, 1984). The model predicts that ceteris paribus, an increase in subsidiary 
plot size causes a decline in both total labor supply and wage labor supply, and an increase 
in the SHP hours (Chandler, 1984). A decrease in wage increases subsidiary plot labor 
supply (ibid.). Consequently, increased land availability for subsidiary plots and declining 
real wages are consistent with the recent relative growth of subsidiary farming in post-Soviet 
countries. 
Wage uncertainty in the collective farm model was first considered by Bradley 
(1971). The author points out that because of differences in tastes, the effort put into 
collective farm work would be unequal among collective farm members. With the residual 
wages model, each worker is uncertain about the quantity of labor supplied to collective 
production by other households. This leads to uncertainty in wage income. Bradley 
concludes intuitively that workers would respond to the wage uncertainty by redirecting 
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labor activities from the collective farm work toward private plot production and leisure, but 
no theoretical model is advanced to study this response. 
Bradley (1973) formalizes his 1971 idea about uncertainty. Marginal income from 
wage work is assumed to be known up to an additive random variable, and similarly, 
marginal income from private production is assumed to have another component defined as 
additive error. The author argues, that in addition to uncertainty in government price and 
procurement policies and natural conditions, which is a part of both random measures, the 
random component in the collective farm remuneration is affected by the number of 
households in the collective. He concludes that the uncertainty of the marginal yield to 
labor must be greater in the collective sector. Again, the intuitive conjecture that this must 
lead to a greater supply of labor to private production is not supported theoretically. 
Cameron (1973b) questions Bradley's assumption that marginal income at the 
collective farm is greater than that at the private plot by pointing to relatively certain state 
procurement price for collective farm output, as opposed to the more or less freely 
determined prices for produce at farmers' markets (the price at which the subsidiary 
household plot output is sold). In addition, the collectivist farm could diversify its activities 
to reduce variability of its revenues. Finally, with large soviet collective farms, the effect of 
variability of collective income due to variability of individual preferences would be small. 
It should be noted, that this entire debate about relative variability of collective versus 
private subsidiary production took place more than twenty years ago in the period of 
political stability in the Soviet Union. The contemporary situation is obviously quite 
different. 
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Bonin (1977) picks up the debate between Bradley and Cameron by explicitly 
modeling uncertainty in a collective farm model. The author considers production 
uncertainty on the collective plot, which, from the perspective of an individual choice 
problem results in an uncertain wage in the collective sector (off-farm wage in AHM 
setting). As a separate question, the author considers the effect of uncertainty in the price of 
private plot output. Under the assumptions of decreasing absolute risk aversion and fixed 
leisure, Bonin shows that individuals reallocate work between plots toward less risky 
remuneration. When leisure is allowed to vary, Bonin considers only the case of both 
uncertainties present (from the collective sector and private plot production) and concludes 
that the effect of the uncertainties on the labor decision can not be signed. While this result 
is true for the private plot price uncertainty case, as it was later shown in detail by 
Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1991), the conclusion does not hold in the case of uncertainty 
from wages alone. 
Outside of the collectivist farm setting, the AHM has been applied to analyze a 
variety of uncertainties. Among others, Fafchamps (1992), Finkelshtain and Chalfant 
(1991), Kurosaki (1995), Mishra and Goodwin (1997) investigated the effects of farm output 
price uncertainty. Yield risks were incorporated into models used by Roe and Graham-
Tomasi (1986), and that investigated by Fabella (1988). However, wage uncertainty has not 
been studied probably because, non-agricultural income has always been treated as being 
less volatile than the agricultural one in market economies. 
Time allocation decisions of pensioners that have access to SHP (i.e., of those 
without market wage opportunities) can be considered within the framework of the AHM 
with absent labor markets. The model, traceable to the works of Chaianov (see, e.g., 
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Strauss, 1986), is laid out analytically by Nakajima (1969). The model restricts the generic 
AHM model by assuming that the household does not sell any labor, and the only time 
choice is between leisure and farm work. Nakajima proved that a decrease in unearned 
income increases farm work hours, a result that in our context means that a decline in real 
pensions increases hours of subsidiary farming by pensioners. Nakajima showed that an 
increase in farm size has an ambiguous effect on farm work hours because of opposite 
income and substitution effects. To date, no known studies have considered the AHM with 
absent labor markets under the assumption of uncertainty. 
Theoretical model of wage earning household 
In the following sections, first, we lay out and discuss the wage earning household 
model in the certainty case. Next, we extend the model to the wage uncertainty setting and 
compare SHP labor hours in the uncertainty case to that when the wage is set identically to 
its mean. Finally, we assume a discrete distribution of wage and investigate changes in 
labor allocation when the probability of receiving wages declines. 
Model set up 
An individual (household) maximizes utility subject to constraints. The individual 
derives utility from consumption of leisure and food. The food can either be produced on 
the subsidiary household plot (SHP) or bought in the market at a certain price. Household 
income comes from wage work and sales of the SHP production. The individual has a 
choice between off-SHP work for a wage, SHP work, and leisure. 
The household is assumed to maximize utility U subject to a total time constraint, 
l + h" +h'' = r, to a budget constraint x = Wh" + f(h'',m), to the constraint of no labor 
32 
from outside of the household, h"  <T ,  and to the mandatory collective farm work 
constraint h" >0. Here x denotes food consumption; I is leisure consumption in hours; 
U{x,l) is the agent's utility function; f(h'',m) is the SHP production function; Wis the 
hourly wage rate measured in units of food per hour; m is the size of the subsidiary plot 
land; h!^ is the time spent working for the wage in hours; If is the time spent working in the 
SHP in hours; and T denotes total hours available to the agent. Conventionally, we use the 
notation g, for a partial derivative of the function g with respect to the i-th argument, and the 
notation g,y, and a second partial derivative of g with respect to the i-th and j-th arguments 
re spec t ive ly ,  i , j  =  1 ,2  ;  g=  U . f .  
With the expressions for j: and I derived from the constraints, the agent's problem 
becomes: 
We will call a solution (ff, h'^) to (2.1) an interior solution if the optimizing values of 
h'^ and are both positive. 
Interior solutions 
Throughout our analysis, we consider interior solutions only. That means that 
neither the option of quitting the wage job, nor the option of quitting the SHP farming is 
considered. While these seem to be strong assumptions, they are supported to some extent 
by the results of earlier surveys. The results reported by ILO (1995), Csaki and Lerman 
(1997), and Perotta (1998) show that quitting SHP farming is not an option for most 
households. However, the question of quitting wage work to concentrate on farming alone 
is a subtier one. 
max T>h''>0. r>h'^>Q. T-h'-h'-SO (2.1) 
The model we consider is applied to both city dwellers and rural residents possessing 
subsidiary household plots. Several studies found that both the unfavorable social image of 
farm work and the perceived transitory nature of uncertainties with wages preclude many 
city workers from quitting wage jobs to start farming. In addition, relatively little 
agricultural experience might also contribute to an unwillingness to become a private 
farmer. 
As for rural residents, quitting wage work while keeping the SHP was legally 
impossible to do up to the early 1990s. Nowadays, with adoption of new land laws, quitting 
wage work means breaking the ties with a collectivist farm that provides their wages and the 
requirement to become a new legal entity, a private farmer. It is a common knowledge (see, 
for example, Maggs (1971), Rumer (1981), Perotta (1999b), Bonanno et al. (1993)) that in 
addition to the wages, the collectivist farms supplied their workers with payments in kind 
and subsidized inputs to their subsidiary plot production. In addition, collectivist farms 
remain major providers of social services in rural areas, like childcare, utilities, and the like. 
The preferred access to the most of the farm provided social services is lost once an 
employee leaves the collectivist farm (Csaki and Lerman (1997); Perotta (1999a)). 
In this smdy, we treat these fringe benefits as a part of the hourly wage and implicidy 
assume that after taking into account these benefits, the expected wage is higher than the 
marginal product of labor in the SHP production. Leaving the collectivist farm is difficult 
because of poorly specified leaving procedures, under-developed farming infrastructure, 
high production risks due to under-developed input markets, and insufficient business 
experience for the most of the collectivist farm workers (Csaki and Lerman (1997); Perotta 
(1999a)). For these reasons, we focus only on redistribution of effort between wage job and 
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subsidiary farming due to wage rate changes. Modeling quitting the collectivist farm to 
establish a private farm is beyond the scope of our study. 
Aggregation of consumption commodities 
We model preferences in just two arguments, food and leisure. In this way, the first 
argument of the utility function is equated to the total income of the household. Several 
assumptions are implicit in this setting. First, we assume that other commodities (not 
explicidy modeled) can be easily exchanged for the food with no or low costs of exchange. 
This is reasonable for the economies in transition: the SHP output can be exchanged for 
goods and services and sold at the farmers' markets relatively easily (e.g., Perotta, 1999a). 
Another implicit assumption is that commodities other than labor could be 
aggregated in the analysis. That is, utility maximization in the aggregated model (2.1) yields 
the same results on labor allocation as an analysis of a model where more than one 
consumption commodity is modeled. Epstein (1975) points out that the aggregated analysis 
might be potentially misleading in an uncertainty setting. Rather than imposing assumptions 
on preferences, we justify the aggregated analysis by limited ability to substitute food for 
other commodities due to low level of income in question. 
According to the Composite commodity theorem, as presented, for example, in 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1983), if a group of prices moves in parallel, then the 
corresponding commodity can be treated as a single good. That means, that the preferences 
defined over the composite conunodity and other original goods lead to the same choices as 
the preferences over original disaggregated goods. The assumption of prices of necessities 
moving together is not unreasonable for the economies in transition. 
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Restricting attention to necessities is permissible because surveys report economy-
wide drops in real income and, consequently, consimiption by most of the population in 
recent years. Poverty increased in Ukraine and Russia over the years of transition 
(Kakwani, 1995; World Bank, 1996; Klugman, 1997). The share of income spent on food 
jumped from approximately 40% in 1980s to 60% in 1990s (Van Atta, 1998). 
In rural areas, poverty is more pronounced than in urban areas: Perotta (1999b) 
reports that more than 62% of the Ukrainian rural population is below the official poverty 
line. The share of income spent on food is consistent with these numbers: Van Atta (1998) 
reports that food accounts for almost 70% of rural household income in 1996 and 1997. 
Here, income includes the value of household produced food. With taxes, housing, and 
utilities accounting for at least 5% of an average rural household income, there is very little 
room for a substitution of food for other consumption goods. Csaki and Lerman (1997) 
found that 50% of a 1996 survey of 1,674 collectivist farm employees could not satisfy even 
the minimum consumption needs of their family. Another 48% of respondents of the survey 
report that they make just enough for necessities and could not afford anything beyond that. 
Urban families, though spending a smaller budget share on food, pay more in 
unavoidable expenses: on average, an urban family spent 70% of its income on food, 
housing, utilities, and taxes in 1996 (Van Atta, 1998). Pensioner incomes must be almost 
completely spent on food. Although no recent data are available, the share of food in 
pensioner total expenditures has always been higher than the average in Ukraine; it 
comprised some 50% in 1990 (MSUSSR, 1991). Thus, the low income levels and high 
shares of household expenditures on food and unavoidable expenses rationalize the form of 
the utility function used in the analysis. 
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Separability 
The first order conditions for an interior solution to the optimization problem (2.1) 
take the form 
0 ,  
dU U,W - C/, = 0-
dh' 
Subtracting the second equation from the first, and assuming > 0, we obtain 
(2.2) 
This equation conveys the familiar optimality condition of the farm household 
model: the SHP labor supply is chosen so that the MRP of labor in SHP production is equal 
to the marginal return to labor on the collectivist farm, i.e., the wage rate. In addition, this 
equation demonstrates that production decisions can be made independendy of consumption 
decisions, while the reverse is not true since consumption depends on production through 
the budget constraint. This property of the AHM is called interchangeably "recursiveness" 
or "separability" (Singh, Squire, and Strauss, 1986). 
A competitive profit-maximizing firm with production function/would make its 
choice of labor exactly according to the rule (2.2). That means, that in the AHM, the 
household's decision, although made simultaneously, could be thought of as being made in 
two steps. First, the household maximizes profits as a purely competitive firm, and then the 
consumption decisions are made given the profits. As it will be shown later in the Chapter, 
the recursiveness is not preserved when the wage is allowed to be stochastic, that is, the 
production decision on ff, does depend on preferences in the case of wage uncertainty. 
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Uncertain wages 
In this section, we extend the model (2.1) to the setting of wage uncertainty. The 
uncertainty in off-SHP income originates from a possibility of non-timely payment of wages. 
We assume that instead of a known wage, the agent deals with an uncertain wage 
with a non-degenerate distribution. The individual still has a choice between off-SHP work 
for a wage, SHP work, and leisure. The time allocation is decided ex ante, while 
consumption of the food is decided after the uncertainty in wage is realized. The individual 
is risk averse in food gambles. 
The household is assumed to maximize expected utility E\(J\ subject to the same 
constraints as before. All the notation of the model (2.1) is preserved, except W is the 
random hourly wage rate measured in units of food per hour. With the uncertainty, the 
agent's problem becomes: 
max £:t/(w7^"+/(/^^m),^-;^''-/^01 (2.3) 
Assumptions 
We assume 
£/, >0, £/2>0; (S.l) 
U u < 0 ,  ( S . 2 )  
/,>0, /„<0. (S.3) 
The assumption (S.l) ensures that marginal utility is positive everywhere over the set 
of relevant consumption bundles, i.e., the agent is not satiated with the consumption of food 
and leisure. In the uncertainty setting, (S.2) formalizes risk aversion in food gambles. 
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Assumptions (S.3) mean that the SHP production function displays positive decreasing 
marginal product of labor over a relevant range of inputs. 
To determine the impact of risk on the agent's decisions, we compare the solution to 
problem (2.3) to the agent's choices in the case when the random wage W is set identically 
to its mean. The certainty counterpart of problem (2.3) is 
Results 
Proposition 2.1 
Let the assumptions (S.l) - (S.3) hold. Let (ff*, h'^') and (ff", h^") be interior 
solutions to (2.3) and (2.3c) respectively. Then ff' > ff". 
Proof of Proposition 2.1 
The solution to (2.3) satisfies the following first-order necessary conditions: 
max 
r>ft''a). r>h'>0. T-h'-h'^O (2.3c) 
dh" ' ' -
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
Subtracting (2.5) from (2.4), we get 
(2.6) 
£[£/,] 
The CO variance term in (2.6) is positive, because 
dU,(Wh'+f )  rr UC ^ • .o on ^ 
^ = Uiih <0 by the assumption (S.2), and — =  - l < 0 .  
Consequently, (2.6) implies 
I 
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f,ih''\m)<EM (2.7) 
If the wage W were fixed at its mean, the first order conditions for utility 
maximization would imply equality in (2.7) instead of the inequality, i.e. 
/,(/z'^,m)<E[w^]=/,(A''-,m). 
Since/// < 0 (assmnption (S.3)), the statement of the proposition follows. 
The proven result is very intuitive: uncertainty in the off-SHP wage forces a risk 
averse agent to shift towards the certain source of income, SHP production. The uncertainty 
reduces the mean wage in terms of behavioral actions: the agent responds to the risk as if the 
wage were below its mean. 
Several points on the proof of the Proposition 2.1 are worth stressing. First, the 
separability of the model is no longer preserved, as the production decision does depend on 
preferences. 
Secondly, the solution to the production decision is no longer parallel to a pure 
production profit maximizing firm decision, as we had in the case of certainty. A 
competitive profit maximizing firm under wage rate uncertainty and risk aversion would 
choose less labor than if the wage rate were set to its mean (Tumovsky, 1969). In contrast, 
our agricultural household model predicts that the labor input will exceed the certainty 
counterpart labor. The difference originates firom the restriction on no hired labor for SHP 
production. Under this restriction, the SHP household is always a net seller of labor, 
> 0 .  C o n s e q u e n d y ,  t h e  w a g e  a f f e c t s  t h e  h o u s e h o l d ' s  n e t  i n c o m e  p o s i t i v e l y  r a t h e r  t h a n  
negatively as in the pure production firm case. Mathematically, this difference shows up 
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when we sign the covariance term in (2.6); had thebe negative (as for the competitive 
firm), the covariance term, and the result of the Proposition 2.1 would be reversed. 
Note that implicit in Proposition 2.1 are some additional assumptions about 
preferences. The existence of the interior solution for the problem (2.3c) implies that the 
utility function is concave in the neighborhood of the solution. The next proposition 
imposes more restrictions on the utility function and on the structure of randomness in W to 
provide a stronger statement about the impact of wage uncertainty on labor supply. 
We replace the assumption (S.2) with a more restrictive 
t/„<0, (S.2*) 
The first three inequalities of the assumption (S.2*) ensure that the utility function is 
strictly concave. The last inequality in (S.2*) means that incremental utility derived from an 
additional unit of leisure does not decrease with the amount of food, and that incremental 
utility derived from an additional unit of food does not decrease with leisure. This 
assumption is not overly restrictive, as, for example, any CES utility function satisfies it. 
Proposition 2.2 
Let the assumptions (S.l), (S.2*), and (S.3) hold. Let W^be a discrete random 
variable with a probability distribution P(V7 = w) = p, P{W = 0) = 1 - p, where w is a 
constant and p e (0,1). The agent is assumed to know the distribution. Let the necessary 
first order conditions (2.4) and (2.5) be satisfied for some positive }f* and h!^'. Then 
(i) The pair (ff', h!^') is the solution for the problem (2.3); 
(ii) A decrease in probability p  of receiving wages increases SHP labor supply f f * ' ,  and 
(iii) A decrease in probability of receiving wages decreases wage work labor supply 
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Proof of Proposition 2.2 is provided in Appendix 1. 
In the proposition proven, a change in the distribution of wages is modeled via a 
decline in the probability of receiving wages. This way of changing the distribution can not 
be referred to as increased uncertainty in receiving wages because both the mean and the 
variance of the distribution are changing. Indeed, as the probability p declines, the mean of 
wages ] = pw declines. However, the variance Var^W] = /?(! - p)w' either increases or 
decreases depending on whether p is less than or more than a one half. A more intuitive way 
of modeling increased uncertainty is as a mean-preserving spread in the distribution. The 
mean-preserving spread is defined as "stretching" the distribution around a constant mean 
(Sandmo, 1971). Although we were not able to sign comparative statics of a mean-
preserving spread for the wage model, we obtained definite results for a pensioner 
household model. 
Theoretical model of pensioner household 
To study the effects of changes in pensions, we adapt the AHM (2.3) by abolishing 
wage work, and by introducing an unearned fixed income, pensions. 
Mode! set up 
An individual (household) maximizes expected utility subject to constraints. The 
individual derives utility from consumption of leisure and food. The food can either be 
produced at the subsidiary household plot (SHP) or bought in the market at a certain price. 
Unlike in the wage earning household, the pensioner household's income comes from sales 
of the SHP production and uncertain pensions. The individual has a choice between SHP 
work and leisure. 
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The household is assumed to maximize expected utility E\U]  subject to a total time 
constraint, l + h'' = T, and to a budget constraint x = P + f(h'',m). Here x denotes food 
consumption; I is leisure consumption in hours; U{xJ) is the agent's utility fiinction; 
f{h'',m) is the SHP production function; P is the pension measured in units of food; mis 
the size of subsidiary plot land; /z'' is the time spent working in the SHP in hours; and T 
denotes total hours available to the agent. We keep the notation/- for a partial derivative of 
the production function/with respect to the i-th argument, and the notation /y for a second 
partial derivative of/with respect to the i-th and j-th arguments respectively, i, j = 1,2. 
For ease of presentation, and in parallel with Block and Heineke (1973), whose 
derivations we follow for some results, we change the notation for the derivatives of the 
utility function. We use the notation Uy for the first partial derivative of U with respect to 
the first argument, and t/, denotes the first partial derivative of U with respect to the second 
argument. 
The agent's problem is 
To determine the impact of risk on the agent's decisions, we compare the solution to 
(2.8) to the agent's choice in the case when the random pension P is set identically to its 
mean. The certainty counterpart of the model (2.8) is 
The certainty model is known as an AHM with absent labor markets (Strauss, 1986). 
It stems from the work of the Russian economist Chaianov from the 1920s, and is presented 
max T>h''>Q (2.8) 
max T>h''>0 (2.8c) 
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in analytic form by Nakajima (1969). In our interpretation of the variables, Nakajima 
showed for the case of certain pensions that a decline in pensions necessarily increases SHP 
labor supply. Here we extend the analysis to the case of the uncertainty. 
Assumptions 
We assume 
Uy>0,  U ,>0;  (S.lp) 
Uyy  < 0, Uii <0, U„>0; (S.2p) 
/. >0, /„<0. (S.3p) 
f <0, f = 0, (S.4P) 
where R is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion in income gambles, 
£/v R = — YY 
Uy 
The first inequality in the (S.4p) formalizes the intuitively plausible assumption of 
diminishing absolute risk aversion. It means that as the agent's income increases, he/she 
becomes increasingly tolerant to risks, while remaining risk averse. The second inequality 
in (S.4p) means that the level of leisure consumption does not affect the absolute risk 
aversion. Cobb-Douglas preferences satisfy (S.4p). 
As before, we consider interior solutions only, i.e. the optimizing value of h is 
positive. 
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Results 
Proposition 2.3 
Let the assumptions (S.lp) — (S.4p) hold. Let h'^and h'^he interior solutions to 
(2.8) and (2.8c) respectively. Then h^' >h'^. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3 is provided in the Appendix 2. 
Finally, we analyze the effect of a change in pension distribution on optimal labor 
supply. The consequence of a decline in the probability of receiving pensions was found to 
be ambiguous. However, we sign the effect of an increase in pension income uncertainty 
modeled as a mean-preserving spread. That is, a pure increase in dispersion via a 
multiplicative parameter is combined with an additive shift in the distribution under the 
restriction that the mean of the distribution is unchanged. 
Proposition 2.4 
Let assumptions (S.lp) - (S.4p) hold. Then a mean-preserving spread in the 
distribution of P increases SHP hours. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4 follows closely Block and Heineke (1973); it is provided in 
Appendix 3. 
Conclusions 
The share of subsidiary household farming in gross agricultural output increased in 
many post-Soviet economies. The neo-classical agricultural model leads us to infer that 
several phenomena occurring in transition economies may cause an increase in the share of 
SHP labor in the total agricultural labor. The results are summarized in the Tables 2.1 and 
2.2. 
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Table 2.1. Comparative statics results for wage earner subsidiary household plot models 
Autonomous 
variation 
Consequential variation in Reference 
SHP hours Wage work Total labor 
hours supply 
Wage decline + 11 Chandler (1984) 
SHP land increase + - - Chandler (1984) 
Wage uncertainty + ? ? Proposition 2.1 
Decline in 
probability of 
receiving wage 
+ - ? Proposition 2.2 
Table 2.2. Comparative statics results for pensioner subsidiary household plot models 
Autonomous variation Consequential variation in SHP 
hours 
Reference 
Pension decline + Nakajima (1969) 
SHP land increase ? Nakajima (1969) 
Pension uncertainty + Proposition 2.3 
Mean-preserving 
spread in pensions 
+ Proposition 2.4 
For wage earning households, a decline in real wages increases supply of labor to 
subsidiary farming. We found that the impact of wage uncertainty for risk averse 
households is similar to that of declining wages in the certainty case; households increase 
the subsidiary farming labor supply. 
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Two features of the model considered allowed signing the effect of wage uncertainty 
on SHP labor supply: availability of the certain income generating activity, and the 
restriction on no outside labor. Considering the labor decision from the consumption side of 
the model, the above-mentioned Block and Heineke (1973)'s 'uncertainty income effect' 
and 'uncertainty substitution effect' apply to different components of the total labor supply. 
The total effect of wage uncertainty in a generic labor supply model is ambiguous, because 
risk averse individuals can not do two things simultaneously: increase work hours to 
alleviate income uncertainty, while reducing involvement into risky wage work. In contrast, 
in the AHM setting, households can have both goods: the availability of SHP farming allows 
them to increase work hours and substitute away from the activity affected by uncertainty by 
increasing SHP hours and reducing wage work. 
As for the production side of the SHP model, the restriction on no SHP labor from 
outside of the household mmed out to be crucial. With this restriction, the net effect of 
wage on household income is always positive, as opposed to the negative one in the purely 
competitive firm case analyzed by Tumovsky (1969). This difference between the AHM 
and the production firm models ultimately leads to the opposite results on the effect of 
uncertainty on labor input used in production in the two models. 
Under the assumption of a discretely distributed wage, we proved a negative 
relationship between probability of receiving wage and subsidiary plot labor supply, and a 
positive one between probability of receiving wage and wage labor supply. These results 
provide theoretical support to the intuitive conjecture that was discussed by Bradley (1971, 
1973), Cameron (1973b), and was proven previously by Bonin (1977) under overly 
restrictive assumptions on leisure allocation and preferences. 
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In the model presented, wages are being modeled as being received as food. Indeed, 
a share of coUectivist farm wages is received in kind in the form of consumption goods 
(Perotta, 1999). However, inputs for SHP production like forage grain, seeds, and young 
animals are also common as forms of remuneration for collectivist farm work (ibid.). With 
cosdy exchange of the latter forms of wages for food, the production input form of wages 
may provide an additional stimulus for the growth of subsidiary farming. An analysis of the 
impact of the non-monetarization of wages on development of subsidiary farming 
constitotes an interesting question for future research. 
As for pensioner households, we showed that an impact of uncertainty in pensions is 
similar to that in wages for the wage earners: the agents respond as if the pension were 
below its mean and increase SHP hours. An increase in uncertainty when modeled as a 
mean-preserving spread increases SHP hours as well. Both results are in parallel to the 
results of Block and Heineke (1973) on the effect of uncertainty in non-wage income on 
wage labor supply when wages are certain and unchanged. 
Admittedly, the relative impact of pensioner SHP production on overall agriculmral 
production might be not large due to natural limitations on time available and productivity. 
Yet, the SHP income has always constituted a large share of pensioner household income. 
Urban pensioners derived 70% and 18% of their income from pensions and SHP, 
respectively, on average in 1990. Pensions of retired collective farmers constituted 48% of 
their income, while 46% were derived from subsidiary farming (MSUSSR, 1991). 
Evaluation of the relative impact of pensioners, and, more broadly, government benefit 
recipients, on gross SHP production is an empirical question to be addressed when more 
data on demographics of SHP producers become available. 
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The results provide a theoretical explanation for the growth of involvement of the 
population in subsidiary farming. In an increasingly volatile economic and political 
situation in the countries in transition, part-time private plot farming is a way for households 
to cope with the decline in incomes and the income risk due to non-payments. Admittedly, 
farming is subject to its own intrinsic volatility due to weather, animal disease, pests, etc. 
Because of that, farm operators in market economies often diversify income by working off-
farm (Huffamn, 1991; Mishtra and Goodwin, 1997). However, in contemporary transition 
economies, the riskiness of wage income is so high, that it outweighs that of farming. That 
is why we ignored SHP yield uncertainty in our analysis. Incorporating both types of 
uncertainties into a model is a subject of future research. 
The analysis of income uncertainty conducted suggests that income stabilization 
policies might have a big impact on labor allocation in agriculture. Currendy, subsidiary 
agriculture absorbs displaced labor from the collective sector of agriculture and other sectors 
of Ukrainian economy. However, this is a transition phenomenon. Subsidiary farming 
should decline once real income starts to grow and stabilize. 
Is the growth of the subsidiary farming socially desirable? Both yes and no. Many 
observers point out that subsidiary farming serves as a cushion in times of economic 
hardship, and this perspective even draws support from some local administrations (O'Brien 
et al., 1996). However, the growth of this form of private farming also has a negative 
consequence: it allows a longer period with no fundamental economic restructuring and 
reform. Van Atta (1998) points out that SHP food production alleviates the edge of the 
hardship thus easing the pressure for real reforms in the economy. 
49 
The subsidiary farming growth is an indication of big distortions in labor markets. 
Ukraine, like many other former Soviet countries, has a highly educated labor force, and a 
system that employs engineers and teachers to work on subsidiary plots is a waste of human 
capital. However, the simation wiU not change unless the constraints on agricultural 
production imposed by absent or non-working markets are lifted. 
An overall progress with economic reforms in agriculture is imperative to reverse the 
movement from conamercial agriculture to a subsistence one. In particular, development of 
land and agricultural input markets will allow some of the subsidiary farms to grow into less 
labor intensive private farms, a process that would entail more specialization and 
commercialization of agricultural production. 
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3. LABOR ALLOCATION IN THE CASE OF CERTAINTY 
The goal of the study is to extend known theoretical results on the effects of 
collective sector wage changes on SHP labor supply and use the newly proven results to 
examine empirically the growth of SHP share in gross agricultural output. First, we use the 
model considered in the previous chapter to investigate the changes in SHP labor when a 
certain wage declines. Under reasonable assumptions on SHP technology, the previously 
known theoretical result is extended to show that the share of SHP hours in total labor 
supply increases in response to a wage decline. Second, the availability and usefulness of 
official oblas^-l&vcl Ukrainian data is evaluated for the purposes of the analysis of SHP 
growth. The results indicate the inherent deficiencies in such data. Next, pre-reform oblast-
level data are used to show that observed tendencies in the time allocation of collective 
farmer families are consistent in general with the theoretical results. Finally, the growth of 
the subsidiary farming share in gross agricultural output is investigated between 1991 and 
1996 using oblast-lor^&l data. We find that as expected from the theory, an increase in the 
share of SHP output in gross agricultural output is consistent with a decline in average real 
agricultural wages and rural-urban composition of population. We do not find a statistically 
significant effect of the availability of agricultural land in the regions on the growth of SHP 
production, a result that may result from measurement error. Due to severe constraints on 
data availability, we impose strong assumptions regarding absent statistics on SHP inputs 
other than land and labor. 
^ Oblast (plural — oblasti) is a Russian name for an administrative region. Ukraine has 24 oblasti and 
1 autonomous republic, Crimea. For ease of reference, we will call all the 25 administrative regions of Ukraine 
oblasti. 
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Theoretical model 
A decline in die collective sector wage was previously proven to increase SHP hours 
(Chandler, 1984). However, the effects on both total and collectivist farm labor supply are 
ambiguous. We impose a reasonable assumption on SHP technology in the AHM 
ftamework to show that the share of the total labor supply devoted to SHP increases with a 
decrease in wages. 
Assumptions 
Assume assumption (S.l) from the previous chapter holds. We repeat it here for 
ease of presentation: 
(7, >0, U,>0;  (S.l) 
We replace (S.2*) with a less restrictive set 
£/„ < 0, ^22 < 0, £/i2 > 0. (S.2**) 
In addition, we replace (S.3) with a more restrictive assumption 
(p{m) ,  where as  (0,1), A is a positive constant, 
and^(/n)>0. (S.3**) 
The first two inequalities in (S.2**) formalize decreasing marginal utilities of food 
and leisure. Assumption (S.3**) means that the SHP production function is log-linear in the 
labor argument. An example of the function satisfying this assumption is a Cobb-Douglas 
function. 
Theoretical results 
Proposition 3.1. 
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Let the assumptions (S.l), (S.2**), and (S.3**) hold. Let {If*, be an interior 
solution to (2.1). Then a decrease in the wage rate W necessarily increases the share of labor 
supply devoted to SHP. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1. 
We re-parameterize the problem (2.1) by replacing the two choice variables h'',h'' 
with h = h'', and k = —. Then h* = h''', k* = —-r - For ease of notation, we suppress 
h" h'^ 
the arguments of the function/. With the re-parameterization, (2.1) is equivalent to 
max U(Wkh + f(h),T-(k + i)h) (3.1) 
h>0, k>0 
The first order necessary conditions for an interior maximum take the form 
dh 
dU 
= U,(Wk + A)-U.{k + l)=0, (3.2) 
= U,Wh-U.h=0 .  (3.3) 
dk 
To derive the impact of changes in the exogenous variable W on the optimal k*, 
dk * 
dW 
, we apply standard comparative statics techniques. The details of the derivations are 
provided in Appendix 4, where we show that > 0. Returning to the notation. 
a ( 1 a ( ^ ^ 1 1 OJ •
 1 
dw h"' +h'' V / ~ dw [i+r J dw (1 + ^*)' 
and the statement of the proposition is proven. 
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The result of the proposition means that a decline in wages increases the relative 
share of SHP hours in the total hours of labor supplied by a household. However, the impact 
of wage change on the total labor supply, h" +h'' = T — I is still ambiguous. 
Let /* be the utility-maximizing choice of leisure consumption. The budget 
constraint the household faces can be written as =Y'^ = Y , where the full income of the 
household, Y, is equal to the full income received, Y"^, and the income spent on food and 
leisure, Y^. The full income received, Y'^, is the sum of the value of the household's 
endowment, plus income from the subsidiary farming, less cost of labor input for the 
SHPrK" = WT + f{h'',m) — Wh''. The full income is spent on food and leisure 
consumption, i.e. Y^ = x + Wl. Then a Slutsky decomposition of a change in leisure 
demand into substitution and income effects takes the form 
The well-behaved utility function ensures that the first term on the right-hand side of 
(3.4), the substitution effect, is negative. The second term, the income effect, is positive, 
and the total effect is ambiguous. However, Strauss (1986, p.76) noted that the income 
effect is weighted by household total labor supply less labor demand, not by the total labor 
supply, as if the household were a supplier of labor solely to wage work. If labor is a normal 
good, the income effect makes a backward bending supply less likely than if the household 
did not have access to the SHP. In our case, this condition means that if declines with 
^ dl' 
dW dW ^ dW 
dW dW ^ ' dY 
dl' dl' dl' 
•Z— = — +/1 • — (3.4) 
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declining wages, then the tendency is likely to be self-reinforcing: the smaller is , the 
smaller is the weight in the income effect in (3.4). Consequently, it is more likely that the 
leisure demand curve is negatively sloped. Given that A'^increases with the declining 
wages, the negatively sloped leisure demand warrants a decline in h'^. Inmitively, a decline 
in wage is likely to reduce both the total and the wage work labor supply. Whether this is 
the case in contemporary Ukraine remains an empirical question to be addressed. However, 
the overall decline in gross agricultural output does not contradict the conjecmre. 
Having proved theoretically that a decline in wages is consistent with an increase in 
SHP share in total labor supply, we turn to empirical evidence. 
Methodological problems with oblast-\eye\ data 
The least aggregated SHP related data published officially are at the oblast-\ew&\. 
However, the information useful for empirical analysis is limited, both on the output of SHP 
production and on the inputs that go into it. 
SHP output 
Official data published on the output of subsidiary fanning presumably come from 
household budget surveys. Yet in addition to sample selection problems in the surveys (see 
the discussion in the Introduction), a problem of under-reporting of SHP production exists. 
Perotta (1999b, p.6) notes that "rural households are deeply worried that questions about 
income, especially income from SHP, are being gathered for the purposes of taxation". 
Presently, there are no taxes imposed on SHP production. However, sporadic and 
inconsistent past govemment policy has taught the population to fear the worst. SHP 
farming is a part of 'unofficial' income as opposed to 'official' sources such as wages and 
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pensions. It is a legal activity nowadays, but government policy toward SHP has swung 
from tolerance in the 1930s, to almost a complete ban in the 1950s, and then an acceptance 
of an annoying reality since 1960s until the end of the Soviet times. The respondents of the 
survey analyzed by Perotta "reminded interviewers of times in the past when chickens, and 
even trees were taxed" (ibid.). Given these reasons, the overall production of subsidiary 
farming might be under-reported. This problem is not exclusive to the aggregated, oblast-
level data, it starts from household-level surveys. In contrast, SHP input reporting may be 
greatly improved once household-survey data become available. 
SHP land 
Although land under SHPs seems to be well documented in the official statistics, it 
might too be misreported. The problem originates from the difference in land in use and 
land owned. The official data tend to rely on land owned. However, Csaki and Lerman 
(1997) found from a 1995 survey of 1674 collectivist farm employees that 74% of 
respondents did not have any certificate of ownership for their plots. Only 31% of SHP land 
was in private ownership, while the remaining land was still in use rights from the state. 
Inputs other than land and labor 
Disposable inputs that go into SHP production are even harder to account for. SHP 
owners rarely had any agricultural machinery (Csaki and Lerman, 1997). In most of the 
cases, rural SHP users acquired production inputs from collectivist farms. Recent surveys 
(Perotta, 1998) confirm that wages in kind remain the major channel of input acquisition for 
rural residents. 
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Perotta (1999a) describes a 'by agreement' channel of acquisition of SHP inputs, 
which in essence is very similar to a grower contracting system in the US. Collectivist farm 
management distributes livestock, especially cattle to workers, pensioners, and other rural 
inhabitants. There is an agreement by which the collectivist farm provides feed in exchange 
for a certain quantity or proportion of livestock produced for the enterprise. As for 
accounting, both livestock and inputs remain listed in the collectivist farm books, while the 
production goes on at the SHP, and a good share of output remains in the household. As an 
example. Baker (1998) mentions a collectivist farm that had 1,200 cows listed on the books 
while only 450 were found in the collective herd. Sedik, Truebold, and Amade (1999, p.30) 
reference stories of the worst collectivist farms fallen into extreme despair, and being 
"cannibalized by their workers who survive on their private plots". 
Virtually no documented information is available on inputs used by urban residents 
other than land. Anecdotal evidence suggests urban SHP owners use very low amounts of 
inputs other than land and labor; seeds and seedlings are either home produced or bought at 
farmers' markets. 
SHP labor 
No official data are available on labor hours in either SHP or total agricultural 
production for all oblasti. The MSUSSR (1991) provides oblast-\&ve.\ breakdowns for time 
spent working SHP in only 14 out of the 25 oblasti of Ukraine, and for the families of 
collective farmers only. Van Atta (1998) reports that in 1995, rural families were surveyed 
in the same 14 oblasti only. 
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The closest data on labor are the counts of SHP plots. However, the number of 
people working a plot depends on fanaily size. In addition, a family might have more than 
one plot if several adults are eligible for the land (Csaki and Lerman, 1997). Perotta (1999a) 
reports that only 42% of 705 rural households surveyed in 1997 had one plot of land to work 
on. Some 37% of the families had two plots, and the remaining 21% used three plots of land 
for SHP. 
In addition to the lack of clear correspondence between the SHP plot and laborer 
numbers, the aggregate oblast counts of SHP plots are not separated by rural and urban 
residents. The number of SHP plots increased from 9.7 to 11.5 million from 1992 to 1998 
(SCSU, 1997; MAPCU, 1999). However, the growth is different for rural and urban 
families: the number of Ukrainian urban households working SHP doubled from 1985 to 
1993, while that of rural households remained almost unchanged over this period (ELO, 
1995). The small growth of rural SHP user numbers is explainable by nearly total 
involvement of rural residents into SHP farming, a situation that existed even before the 
reforms started. Notwithstanding the abrupt growth of the number of city-based subsidiary 
farmers, the involvement of rural families into SHP farming is still much greater than that of 
the urban population. According to household budget surveys conducted in 1997, more 
rural households possessed household plots than did the urban ones. Of all the families 
surveyed, 98.9% of rural households had SHPs as compared to 28.5% of urban households 
(Van Atta, 1998). 
Two indicators, land in use and income derived, point to the fact that the bulk of 
SHP labor comes from the rural population. Land available to the urban population is still 
less than that in use by rural SHP users. Van Atta (1998) reports that as of Jan.l, 1998, the 
total agricultural land in use by urban SHP users is less than 9% of the total agricultural land 
under Ukrainian SHPs. The average family land plot in 1997 was 0.09 ha for urban and 
0.52 ha for rural households (ibid.). Even more revealing, the income from the SHP by an 
urban household was almost one seventeenth that of a rural family consisting of 124 Hm^ 
and 2,149 Hm in 1997 respectively (ibid.). In addition, urban households depend on SHP 
much less than do rural ones. Only 4% of an average urban household income comes from 
SHP, while rural households derive 53% of their income from the subsidiary farming (ibid.). 
All these data suggest that the majority of the SHP labor comes from the rural population. 
Given that the urban-rural composition of population varies widely across different oblasti, 
the use of the growth of the count of SHP plots as a measure of the growth of SHP hours 
with no differentiation by rural-urban residency is of little use. 
Although we acknowledge the potential shortcomings of data, we attempt to analyze 
the development of subsidiary farming with the available data. First, we review empirical 
evidence from the 1960s on the relationship between wages and SHP labor supply. Next, 
we consider summaries of 1990 household budget surveys together with World Bank survey 
results (Lerman, Brooks, and Csaki, 1994) to show that observed relationships between SHP 
time and wages, and those between SHP time and plot size are in agreement with the theory. 
Finally, we use more recent data to investigate the growth of the SHP share in gross 
agricultural output. 
^ Hm stands for hrivna, the current Ukrainian currency. 
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Pre-reform empirical evidence 
Chandler (1984)''s evidence on 1960s SHP labor 
The only known empirical evidence on SHP labor allocation is that provided by 
Chandler (1984) who analyzed collective farm and SHP labor supply of Soviet collective 
farmers in 1960s. Chandler fitted collective farm labor supply functions using Soviet 
republic- average data for the years 1963, 1967, and 1970. SHP labor supply functions were 
estimated using Soviet republic- average data for 1968. Separate labor supply functions 
were estimated for able-bodied male and able-bodied female collective farmers. The author 
obtained mixed results for female collective farmers and explained them by different types 
of work women do in collective farming, specifically, seasonal versus year-around. The 
results for the male supply function estimations were consistent with the theoretical 
predictions: the SHP labor supply depends negatively on wage and positively on plot size. 
The opposite is true for the collective farm labor supply. 
1990 evidence 
The 1990 family budget surveys (FBS) can be used to verify consistency with 
theoretical predictions. Unfortunately, lack of complete data does not allow us to estimate 
any forms of labor supply functions, although some descriptive analysis is possible. 
Sunmiaries of FBS provide average share of time that a collective farmer family 
spent working SHP in 1990 (MSUSSR, 1991). The averages are reported for 14 out of 25 
Ukrainian oblasti. The same data source reports average family income separated into four 
categories: collective farm wages, other wages, pensions and state provided subsidies, and 
SHP income. All the data are reported in current Ukrainian (then Soviet) currency, BCrb. 
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We constructed several measures of non-SHP income and plotted the data using the oblast 
averages as observations. One of the plots, SHP share in family time versus wages received 
by the family members, is shown on the Fig. 3.1. The plot reveals a negative trend between 
the share of SHP time and wages. Use of other non-SHP income measures generates similar 
plots. 
We acknowledge that the plots are not very conclusive evidence on the theoretical 
predictions. The results proven theoretically state that there is a negative relationship 
between the share of SHP hours and wages under the assumption of ceteris paribus. In this 
case the assumption means that the families have the same tastes, SHP technology, plots, 
and other inputs across the 14 regions of Ukraine. We are willing to assume the same 
preferences and same technology for the SHP production. However, inputs and plots might 
well differ by regions. Yet, no inputs are reported in the FSB. 
Average SHP plots for rural families are provided in Lerman, Brooks, and Csaki 
(1994). Some 600 collectivist farm employees were surveyed in seven oblasti for which we 
have the SHP time share data from the FBS. We combined the two data sources to plot the 
SHP time share versus average plot size in Fig. 3.2. As w-ith the wages, the relationship is 
consistent with theoretical results. The larger are the plots, the higher is the share of time 
spent working SHP in total hours worked. 
Having found that pre-reform data in general do not contradict the theoretical 
predictions, we turn to current data. Instead of evaluating static relationships, we estimate a 
change in SHP share in gross agricultural output from 1991 to 1996. Since we have no 
means to correct for possible measurement error in SHP production, we ignore this problem 
in our estimation. Proxy variables are used to measure SHP inputs. 
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Figure 3.1 SHP time share in family labor supply versus wage index (Ui^raine average = 100); 
1990 averages for 14 Ukrainian ohlasti; percent. 
Coefficient of correlation = -0.31; p-value = 0.23. 
Source: MSUSSR, 1991. 
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Figure 3.2 SHP time share in family labor supply versus SHP size; 
1990 averages for 7 Ukrainian oblasti; percent. 
Coefficient of correlation = 0.66; p-value = 0.10. 
Sources; MSUSSR, 1991; Lennan, Brooks, and Csaki, 1994. 
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The model 
To derive the model to be estimated, we assume existence of two region-level 
aggregate production functions, one for the SHP sector of agriculture, and the other for the 
whole agricultural production sector. The two production functions are each of Cobb-
Douglas form: 
where Ys, Yt are the outputs of subsidiary plot sector and the gross agricultural output 
respectively; L^, L, denote land in SHP and gross agricultural production respectively; Hs, H, 
are the labor inputs in SHP and gross agricultural production respectively; and K^, K, are 
other (capital) inputs in SHP and gross agricultural production respectively. The parameters 
As, At represent disembodied technical change and other factors affecting production 
irrespectively of inputs and regions. The parameters a and /3 are the elasticities of output 
with respect to the corresponding inputs; 
> 0, A, > 0, a e (0,1), p. e (0,1), i = 1,2,3. 
Our primary interest is in the change over time in the share of SHP output in the 
gross agricultural output, i.e., in the change over time in 
. (3.5) 
Taking logs and then first differences, we obtain the following specification 
fH, !  
Ch 
A 
t 
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Alog — =Alog 
( a  \  
 Al -f 
.  .  ( L \  
+ (a.-)3,)Alog(//,) 
+ a, A log +(a,-y3i)Alog(Lj 
(3.6) 
+ (a3-^3)AIog(/s:,) 
We estimate a version of the above model using oblast-ltwei data for 1991 and 1996. 
Below we discuss measuring the terms on the right hand side of (3.6) and justify dropping 
some of them from the estimated model. 
Modeling right hand side variables 
Because of financial difficulties the coUectivist farms have run into since the 
beginning of the economic reforms in 1990, the agricultural sector has not adopted any 
technical innovations that might have altered production significantly. Consequently, we 
may safely set Alog(A^ / A,) = 0 in modeling equation (3.6). 
Land 
Data on total land in agricultural use and agricultural land under SHP are available 
from official Ukrainian statistics (SCSU, 1997). Since it is not clear whether the SHP land 
reported is land in use or land owned, we checked the data for consistency. 
Intuitively, the demand for SHP land should be higher in the regions with the 
greatest decline in incomes. However, given a very large drop in real incomes in all regions, 
and free distribution of land for subsidiary plots, the demand for SHP land is almost infinite 
and is constrained by federal and local land distribution policies only. Not surprisingly, we 
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found no evidence of a relationship between a decline in real wages and an increase in SHP 
area for oblastAe.\c\ data. 
Given that SHP land was allotted from coliectivist farms proportionately to area (see 
the description of land reform in the Introduction), one might expect variation in the change 
in SHP area across regions to be determined greatly by the initial supply, i.e. by land 
availability. Surprisingly, we found no dependency between the increase of the reported 
SHP land and agricultural land per capita at the oblast level. We believe that this is an 
indication of land reported on ownership, and not on use basis. Current land laws support 
this explanation. Perotta (1999a) notes that only land located within the boundaries of a 
settlement (village, town) can be transferred to private ownership for subsidiary farming. 
That means that the oblast-\e.\&\ data are too aggregated to reveal the dependency of 
privately owned SHP area growth on land availability. To model the growth of land input 
to SHP production we hypothesize a positive relationship between SHP land in use and 
agricultural land per rural resident. Consequently, we approximate the changes in SHP land, 
A log(L, Iwith agricultural land per rural resident. 
For the purposes of the model, we ignore the existence of officially registered private 
farms. This is justifiable given their lack of visibility in Ukrainian agriculture. As of 1997, 
the officially registered private farms occupied 2.2% of Ukrainian agricultural land and 
produced a half of a percent of gross agricultural output only (SCSU, 1997). With this 
assumption, 
L ,=L,+L„ + K,=K,+K,, 
where Lc, He, and Kc denote land, labor, and capital, respectively, of the collective sector of 
agriculture respectively. With this simplifying assumption, all the land annexed from the 
collectivist farms went into SHP farming. Thus, the total agricultural land used, Lf, did not 
change, and this justifies setting (a^ ~ P2) = 0 in (3.6). 
Labor 
The total labor in agriculture. Hi, consists of hours of collectivist farm work by rural 
residents. He, SHP hours by rural residents, H^, and SHP hours by urban residents, H", i.e. 
4-H; ,  
where H ^  =  H [  + H " .  
Based on the Proposition 3.1, ceteris paribus, the share of hours in SHP production 
in total labor hours is a decreasing function of a relevant wage. Given the almost 
nonexistent employment oppormnities outside of collectivist farms in rural areas, the wage 
paid by collectivist farms is the one on which labor allocation decisions are made by most of 
the rural residents. 
Average wages paid at the collectivist farms and economy-wide average wages 
moved in unison over the time period considered (Fig. 1.2). However, the rural and the 
urban SHP producers differ in a number of ways other than wages that affect their decision 
on SHP hours. For example, rural residents receive the bulk of SHP inputs through 
collectivist farms, often as wages in kind. This input acquisition channel is inaccessible for 
most of the city-based SHP producers. Urban residents have to travel to their plots, and this 
entails additional costs associated with the SHP production. Other factors like wage arrears 
and plant closing in heavy industries and mining may affect the decisions of urban 
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population in affected regions. Since we have neither urban-rural composition of SHP 
producers, nor urban wages for the years of interest by oblast, we do not model the urban 
and rural SHP hours separately. Instead, we treat the real wage in the collective sector of 
agriculture as the one relevant to the SHP labor allocation decision, and include an 
additional explanatory variable, the share of rural population in oblast population, to control 
for the urban-rural structure of SHP labor. 
Intuitively, if a region is relatively urban, then collective agriculture is relatively 
small, and a large increase in SHP hours is weighted down by less gross agricultural hours, 
as compared to a relatively rural region. Consequently, the share of SHP in total agricultural 
production grows higher simply because the total agricultural production is small. More 
rigorously, using first order Taylor series approximation, we show that 
.. ( H: 
Alog—- ~ A log 
H, + rural) ^  (3-7) 
where is the share of rural residents in the working age population, and y is a 
decreasing function of its argument. Derivation of the relationship (3.7) is provided in 
Appendix 5. 
Using the result of Proposition 3.1, we model Alog(H^'' + H^)) as a function of 
AlogG^^), the change in real agriculmral wages. Here W denotes the oblast-averagQ real 
agricultural wage. 
Finally, the remaining labor term in (3.6), (a, - /3, )A log{H,), is ignored. 
Theoretically, the change in total collectivist and SHP labor hours is ambiguous. For the 
purposes of the model, we may assume that the combined number of hours worked by rural 
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residents in the collective sector and at their SHP, , did not change over time. Then 
any change in comes from an increase in urban population hours. However, as we 
argued above, labor contribution of urban residents to total SHP labor is relatively small. In 
addition, the overall sign and magnitude of the term (a, - ) is ambiguous, as no smdies 
are known that estimated labor elasticity a, in SHP production. One might expect the 
elasticity of labor in SHP production to be comparable with ±at in total agricultural 
production, thus making the impact of this term small. Thus, we assume that the difference 
in labor elasticities and small contribution of city-based subsidiary farmers make the term 
(a, — Pi )A log(H,) negligibly small and ignore it in the model. 
Other inputs 
The total use of agricultural inputs other than land and labor, AT,, declined 
considerably over the years of reforms (e.g.. World Bank, 1994; Csaki and Lerman, 1997). 
In addition, although SHP land and labor grew substantially, overall SHP production grew 
only a little over the last years (Fig. 1.4 and Fig. 1.5). This suggests that similar to the total 
agricultural production, the use of inputs other than land and labor in SHP production 
declined. In terms of our model, that means that both Ks and /sT, declined over time, and the 
overall sign of AlogCAT^ / K,) is ambiguous. We assume that Ks and Kt decreased 
proportionately, i.e. we set A log(/ AT,) = 0. As for the change in total other input use, we 
measure K, conventionally with total production expenditures less labor expenditures'^. 
* Due to absent land markets, payments for land are still negligible in the cost of agricultural 
production in Ukraine (Csaki and Lerman, 1997). 
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Data 
Data on 25 Ukrainian administrative regions {pblasti) were constructed using 
published statistics and the collectivist farm census (for a description of the census, see, for 
example, Bouzaher, Carriquiry, and Jensen, 1994). Table 3.1 lists sources of raw data; the 
summary of the data is reported in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.1. Definition and sources of variables 
Symbol Variable Units Sources of raw data 
CCOST Change in the cost of 
production net of 
wages, 1991-96 
Author's calculations from collective 
farm census 
CWG Change in the average 
real agricultural wage, 
1991-96 
- - World Bank, 1996; SCSU, 1997, 
p.85; Ukrainian Economic Trends, 
1998 
CYC Change in the per 
employee output of 
collective sector 
SCSU, 1997, pp.73, 78, 79, 84 
CYST Change in the 
proportion of 
subsidiary farming in 
gross agricultural 
output, 1991-96 
SCSU, 1997, p.79 
LANDAV Agricultural land per 
rural resident in 1996 
Hectares MSU, 1996, p.7; SCSU, 1997, p.86 
SRURAL Share of rural residents 
in the working age 
population in 1990 
World Bank, 1993, p.l30 
YPW91 Per employee output of Thousand 
collective sector in 1983 Krb. 
1991 
SCSU, 1997, pp.73, 84 
f 
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Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics of variables ^ 
Variable Units Sample mean St. deviation Minimum Maximum 
CCOST 0.041 0.011 0.017 0.065 
CWG 0.202 0.033 0.135 0.250 
CYC 0.62 0.10 0.49 0.90 
CYST 1.71 0.21 1.42 2.10 
LANDAV Hectares 2.7 1.3 0.6 5.0 
SRURAL 0.36 0.14 0.09 0.57 
YPW9I Thousand 
1983 Krb. 
6.6 1.8 2.9 9.3 
The unit of observation is oblasf, 25 observations in total. 
Two variables, the change in costs, CCOST, and change in wages, CWG, were 
constructed using nominal raw data. Costs of production data were obtained by summing up 
the nominal costs reported in the census by oblast. The resulting figures then were deflated 
using the GDP deflator. Nominal agricultural wages were reported in official statistics; they 
were deflated using the CPI. We admit that in the presence of high inflation, reliance on 
nominal data leads to potential measurement errors. We ignore the problem in the present 
study because of shortage of data. 
Wage data might have some additional drawbacks. The wage reported in the official 
statistics is the accrued wage, and not necessarily the received one. The actually received 
wages might be higher because of payments in kind. Collectivist farms use wholesale prices 
to find monetary equivalent of agricultural produce and inputs distributed in lieu of wages. 
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This practice increases resale value of the wages received in kind. In contrast, for the years 
after 1994, the wages actually received might be lower than the accrued one because of 
wage arrears. Lack of data on wages in kind and wage arrears does not allow us to make 
any corrections. 
Econometric model 
The following model was fit. 
SHP share growth equation 
log(CKS7;.) = «„ + a^CWG, + a. logiSRURAL,) 
(3.8) 
+ a^LANDAV, + (x^ logiCCOST,) + e, 
Wage growth equation 
CWG, =Po + Pi logCCrC,) + P. log(YPW9l,) + (3.9) 
The unit of observation is oblast; 25 observations are used in both equations; i = 1,...,25. 
The SHP share change equation is a direct counterpart of the equation (3.6). Labor 
hours are modeled as a fiinction of CWG, the change in the average real agricultural wage. 
From the result of the Proposition 3.1, we expect a negative sign on the coefficient a,. The 
share of rural population in oblast working age population, SRURAL, is included to control 
for urban-rural composition of SHP labor in accordance with (3.7). From the derivations, 
we expect a negative sign on the coefficient . The agricultural land per rural resident, 
LANDAV, is included to measure the transfer of land from collectivist farm use towards 
SHP. From the current land laws, we expect the sign to be positive. Finally, the change in 
I 
I 
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the total cost of production net of labor costs, CCOST, measures change in the use of inputs 
other than land and labor. 
The wage equation (3.9) was added to the model to account for endogeneity of wage 
changes. 
Endogeneity of wages 
Before 1990, the state exercised strict control over wages in all sectors of economy, 
including agriculture. This system was temporarily abandoned between April 1991 and 
November 1992, and enterprises were given some freedom to determine wages (World 
Bank, 1996). The experiment did not last because monopolies quickly led to rapidly rising 
prices and higher wages, and this was blamed for accelerated inflation. Agricultural 
producers lost considerably in this situation, as prices of agricultural output remained under 
state control and did not grow as fast. Since late 1992, the state essentially retumed to the 
Soviet system of wage control in the collective sector. Currently, the state set wage fund 
limits are enforced by a highly progressive tax, up to 300% on expendimres in excess to the 
wage fund limits (ibid.). Since 1993, the farm wage fund has been allowed to vary with 
production in volume terms (ILO, 1995). 
The development of wage control legislation suggests that changes in agricultural 
wages might be correlated with the collective sector performance. To account for this 
tendency, we used an instrumental variables approach. 
Two variables, the change in the per employee collective sector output 1991-1996, 
CYC, and the per employee output in the collective sector in 1991, YPW91, were used as the 
instruments for the change in wage. Presumably, the smaller was the decline in the 
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collective sector output, the smaller was the decline in the real agricultural wages. Thus, the 
sign of is expected to be positive. The 1991 output per worker is used as an instrament 
based on the belief that the regions of high agricultural output would have more support for 
agriculture from the oblast administration. Then, the administration's favor might show up 
as a smaller decline in the real agricultural wages, i.e. the sign of is positive. 
Estimation results 
Estimation results are summarized in the Table 3.3. The system of equations (3.8) -
(3.9) was fitted using two stage least squares method. We conducted Hausman specification 
tests (e.g., Greene, 1997) to check whether the use of the wage equation is necessary. Under 
the null hypothesis of exogenous change in real wage, an additional variable included in the 
equation (3.8), CWGres, would have an insignificant coefficient. Here CWGres is the 
residual obtained from the estimation of the wage equation (3.9). Since the coefficient of 
the CWGres turned out to be significant at the 5 percent level of significance, we rejected 
the null hypothesis of exogenous CWG for the equation (3.8). Thus, the model (3.8) - (3.9) 
was estimated. 
Checking for heteroscedasticity 
Residuals from both equations (3.8) and (3.9) were investigated to check for possible 
heteroscedasticity originating from the sample construction. The variance of a mean of n 
observations is g' /n , where cr* is the variance of one observation. Since some of the 
explanatory variables are functions of oblast averages, the error terms in both (3.8) and (3.9) 
might have variances proportional to the inverse of the oblast working age 
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Table 3.3 Results of two stage least squares analysis ^ 
Variable Estimate Standard error 
SHP share growth equation 
Intercept 
CWG 
log(SRURAL) 
LANDAV 
log(CCOST) 
= 0.63 
Wage growth equation 
Intercept 
log(CYC) 
log(YPW91) 
R^ = 0.62 
" Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
•Indicates statistical significance at the 1% level of significance. 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level of significance. 
population. However, the plots of residuals versus fitted values and versus the oblast 
working age population did not reveal any tendencies. Therefore, we concluded that the 
errors e,.and u^ 'in (3.8) and (3.9) are not heteroscedastic. 
Parameter estimates 
The model provided moderate fit, = 0.63 for the SHP share change equation, and 
R' = 0.62 for the wage equation. In the wage growth equation, the signs of the instrumental 
1.35 
-2.38 
-0.127 
0.019 
0.166 
0.150 
0.227 
0.088 
0.38* 
0.83* 
0.047** 
0.019 
0.076** 
0.026* 
0.038* 
0.019* 
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variables are as expected. The results imply that changes in average real agricultiu^ wage 
are related to the decline in the per employee collective sector output and pre-reform 
collective sector productivity. 
In the SHP share change equation, the signs of the variables pertaining to land and 
labor are as expected. The results suggest that higher growth in the share of SHP production 
in gross agricultural production is associated with deeper decline in the collective sector 
wages, and higher share of rural population. We focus on significance and sign, since the 
magnitude of the estimates is difficult to interpret given the substitution of observed 
measures in place of the theoretical model variables. 
The effect of land availability is positive, but insignificant. This might be a 
consequence of the possible error in the measurement of the expansion of land under SHP. 
Measurement errors are known to bias the corresponding coefficient estimates toward zero; 
this is referred to as attenuation of the estimates (Fuller, 1987). 
The coefficient of log(CCOST) is positive and significant. By the model 
construction, the coefficient measures the difference in the elasticities of agriculmral output 
with respect to other inputs in SHP and gross agricultural production. The positive 
difference found suggests that a one- percent increase in other inputs would produce a 
higher percentage increase in SHP production than that in the gross production. This 
suggests that given the current land and labor allocation between SHP and the collective 
production, the former is more constrained by restricted access to other inputs. 
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Conclusions 
We investigated the consequences of wage decline on the composition of labor in 
agricultural production under the current institutional structure in Ukraine. The theoretical 
model predicts that the share of SHP hours in total labor supply wiU increase with a wage 
decline. Empirical evidence from pre-reform times supports the theory in general. 
The estimation of the change in the growth of the share of SHP in gross agriculmral 
production revealed relationships consistent with the theoretical result, when the effect of 
the change in real wages is interpreted as the reason for change in the composition of the 
total labor supply in agriculture. 
As more data become available, a larger system of equations may be estimated, 
where the relationship between the change in the real wages and the change in the collective 
sector output is modeled completely. Presentiy, we treat the change in the per employee 
output of the collective sector as an exogenous variable in the equation (3.9). Yet, 
endogenous explanatory variables lead to inconsistent estimates. Lack of data does not 
allow us to model the link between the change in the per employee output of the collective 
sector and the change in SHP share of gross output. Ideally, a system of at least four 
equations would be desirable to estimate. The system would consist of an SHP production 
function, collective sector production function, a wage equation, and an equation, 
corresponding to decisions on labor allocation between the sectors. 
The results obtained highlight the necessity of improved data collection on SHP 
production, and especially on inputs used. SHP is becoming an increasingly important 
component of gross agricultural production in Ukraine. Therefore, it should receive the 
necessary attention in both economic research and policy analysis. For example, there is a 
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considerable debate going on among Ukrainian policymakers on strategic approaches to 
privatization in agriculture. Should the private farming grow from-the-bottom-up, that is 
from SHP farming to private farms? Alternatively, should it grow from-the-top-down, i.e. 
by dividing large collectivist farms into production subdivisions with autonomy of decisions 
and financial responsibilities? Clearly, for either approach, reforms must occur in 
development of land and agricultural input markets. Of course, the best approach may differ 
by regions depending on local conditions. Yet, appropriate agricultural policy depends on 
the answer to the question, as the best feasible tax, credit, or investment policies might well 
differ depending on what approach is chosen. Good understanding of how different sectors 
interact presently is required to inform such policy alternative. 
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4. TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY OF GRAIN PRODUCTION 
In this study of Ukrainian grain producing farms, we estimate a frontier production 
function, examine the changes in technical efficiency at the earliest stages of the economic 
reforms, and evaluate the relationship between technical efficiency and farm workforce 
composition. The analysis includes quantifying the changes of production, input use, and 
the efficiency over time in order to obtain estimates of the effects of factors associated with 
technical inefficiency and the elasticities of grain production with respect to the different 
inputs and retums-to-scale. A combination of the three favorable factors: the time period 
analyzed, the quality of data, and the model employed, makes our study differ from previous 
research. Our study covers the beginning of the reforms, utilizes farm-level data reported in 
physical units, and employs an inefficiency model that allows for simultaneous estimation of 
the parameters of both the frontier production function and the inefficiency effects. To our 
knowledge, no study has accomplished similar analysis for any of the countries of the 
former Soviet Union. 
Background and justification 
Concept of technical efficiency 
Technical efficiency of a producer refers to the ability of a production unit to achieve 
maximum possible output given the technology and quantities of inputs available. Technical 
inefficiency of a particular firm could be defined as the amount by which firm's output falls 
short of the maximum possible output obtainable given the technology and input quantities 
(see, for example, Lovell, 1993; Coelli, Prasada Rao, and Battese, 1998). The fiinction 
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relating the quantities of inputs to the maximum possible output is called the production 
frontier function. 
The existence of technical inefficiency of firms engaged in production has been a 
subject of debate. Stigler (1976) observes that measured technical inefficiency may be a 
reflection of a failure to incorporate the right variables and to specify the right economic 
objective of the production unit. Muller (1974) argues that if all inputs are taken into 
account, measured productivity differences should disappear except for random 
disturbances. 
However, the problem of inclusion of all inputs is a difficult one. Some inputs, as 
information, or managerial ability, knowledge and experience are not easy to measure. 
Moreover, even when some of these inputs are measurable, for example, by years at the 
current occupation, or by years of formal schooling, another problem arises. 
Managerial ability is an input that is applied when needed, as is information. The 
need for these inputs, in turn, is not generally uniform over time or over producers. The 
need increases when the normal production process is disturbed by an unexpected event, like 
equipment failure. Droughts, floods, and sudden weather changes are examples of other 
events randomly affecting agricultural production. Since the need for the managerial input 
depends on a random event, the amount of the input applied is random. Consequently, the 
input can not be treated as are other regular inputs. One of the possible ways to treat this 
randomness is to refer to the concept of technical inefficiency. 
Variation in managerial ability is a part of the variation in technical efficiency. The 
other possible sources of the differences in technical efficiency among farms are differences 
in access to information, differences in access to credit, or differences in organizational 
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structures of farms (Lovell, 1993). These factors all refer to the physical ability of the 
producer to achieve the best practice frontier. 
In addition to the question of the physical ability to achieve the frontier, the question 
of eagerness to achieve the frontier comes up in many settings. The incentives of the 
manager and workers to achieve highest possible production given the resources available 
may be affected by ownership structure of a farm. Regulatory changes affecting the degree 
of competitiveness of an industry environment, for example, opening up for international 
trade, may also change the pressure on producers to do their best (Lovell, 1993). The 
technical efficiency framework allows quantifying the effect of changes in these factors on 
production, making it a valuable tool for policy analysis. 
Ability to deal with disequillbria 
Managerial ability is one of the instances of what Schultz (1975) called the ability to 
deal with disequilibria. He defined this concept as the ability of individuals to "perceive, to 
interpret correctly, and to undertake action that will appropriately reallocate their resources" 
(Schultz, 1975, p.827) in response to a changed economic environment. Schultz argued that 
changes in economic conditions increase demand for the ability to regain equilibrium in a 
new environment. 
Loosely speaking, the random disturbances affecting production alter the 
"equilibrium" of normal production. In this situation the manager's, or more generally, the 
farm's ability to regain the "equilibrium" comes into play. This way, farm's technical 
efficiency reflects in part farm's ability to deal wi± disequilibria, and the farm's ability to 
deal with disequilibria explains in part variation in technical efficiency among farms. 
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Inefficiency explanatory variables 
In the current study, the differences in technical efficiency performance of 
coUectivist farms are explained by exploring the link between efficiency and the ability to 
deal with economic disequlibria. Schultz (1975) argued that the person's ability to deal with 
economic disequilibria is enhanced by education and experience. Accordingly, we focus on 
the factors representing farm human capital. 
In addition, the effect of farm production infrastructure on technical efficiency is 
analyzed in this smdy. The effect of changes in conditions under which the farms operate is 
captured by a year variable. These conditions include instimtional and other infrastructure 
constraints. 
The process of reforms in formerly planned economies might be thought of as the 
process of adjustment and reallocation of resources as the economy moves from one 
equilibrium state corresponding to a planned system to another corresponding to a more 
market oriented system. Under the old system, the production environment remained stable 
over many years, and farm managers knew from their experience how the system worked, 
and what were the objectives and incentives of economic agents involved in production: 
farm workers, local administration, government procurement agencies, and party officials. 
This knowledge allowed them to achieve successfully their goals, like maintaining 
appropriate social stams and local power through fulfillment of state production plans. The 
production possibilities frontier was well known from experience, and particularly, the 
managers gained knowledge on how to organize, motivate, and monitor employees. 
The start of the reforms meant drastic changes in the known economic environment: 
prices started to reflect scarcity of economic resources and financial results started to play an 
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increasingly important role in valuation of farm performance. The number of choices for 
farm workers increased: in particular, the workers now had more choice in the number of 
hours to work at the coUectivist farm. The altered possibilities increased the demand for the 
managers' ability to make efficient choices to achieve a new equilibrium in the economic 
system with the changed rules, objectives, and constraints. 
Why focus on grain? 
The analysis of this study focuses on grain. Although state and collective farms were 
very diversified agricultural enterprises, most of them produced grains. 
Grain is one of Ukraine's most important agricultural products. Ukraine produced 
on average 47.4 million tons of cereals per year in 1986-1990. Grains were grown on some 
14,541 thousand hectares on average over the years 1989-1992, an area which represents 44 
to 45 percent of the total Ukrainian area sown. Grains are the essential crop for both 
livestock production and human consumption. Wheat accounted for 49% of the total area 
cultivated under cereals on average in 1989-1993. Barley, the most important feed grain, 
accounted for 19%, followed by maize (15%) (World Bank, 1994). The significance of 
grain comes also from the fact that it is one of the commodities used by government in 
barter trade with other former Soviet Union countries (Pogozheva and Chenard, 1997). 
Currentiy, over 90% of Ukrainian grain is still produced by the former state and collective 
farms (Valdes et al., 1997). 
Because of this significance both during and after the Soviet time, farm managers 
regarded grain production as the most important one, and were motivated to do their best 
with this crop. Thus, they accumulated ample experience in growing grain. Hence, changes 
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in and determinants of collectivist farm technical efficiency should be revealed better in 
grain production than in any other product. 
Literature review 
Technical efficiency measurement techniques 
There are two primary methods, econometric and mathematical programming, for 
construction of production frontiers and the measurement of efficiency relative to the 
constructed frontiers (see, for example, the surveys by Bauer (1990); Greene (1993); Coelli, 
(1995b); Sieford (1996); Coelli, Prasada Rao, and Battese (1998)). 
The econometric approach involves estimation of a frontier production model of the 
general form (for panel data) 
yu =/U„;^)  + v,v 
where }/,> is output for farm i in year r; yfj is a known function of its arguments, xu is a 
vector of inputs for farm i in year f; is a vector of parameters to be estimated, v is the 
random error term, w is a non-negative measure of technical inefficiency. Altemative 
assumptions about distribution of the inefficiency measure ii, estimation methods, and 
functional forms for the function/(.j, lead to different modifications of this model. 
The mathematical programming approach, also called data envelopment analysis 
(DEA), involves construction a non-parametric envelopment frontier over the data points 
such that all observed points lie on or below the production frontier. Alternative 
assumptions about returns to scale and input or output orientation of efficiency measures 
distinguish the models. 
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The essential differences between the models concern two characteristics: treatment 
of random noise, and flexibility in the structure of production technology. The econometric 
approach discriminates between the noise and inefficiency, while the programn^iing approach 
piles noise and inefficiency together and calls the combination inefficiency. The 
econometric approach is parametric, because it requires specification of a functional form 
for the function jtJ- Consequentiy, misspecification of the function could lead to spurious 
inefficiency being estimated, while the nonparametric DEA approach is less prone to this 
type of error. 
Although neither approach is uniformly the best in all instances, the analysis of 
agricultural production in former Soviet countries calls for the econometric approach. 
Agricultural production is inherentiy variable, due to weather, fires, pests, diseases, 
etc. As Coelli and Battese (1996) argue, this makes DEA a less favorable technique than the 
stochastic approach, for the latter does not assume that all the deviations from the frontier 
are due to inefficiency. Furthermore, FSU data were tabulated manually, at least until 
recently and especially in rural areas. Consequently, the available data on production are 
likely to have substantial measurement error (Brock, 1997). 
Inefficiency explanation 
Since the first smdies on technical efficiency, researchers tried not only to evaluate, 
but also explain differences in efficiency scores of different firms. The natural candidates 
on the inefficiency explanatory variables were various socio-economic variables (see, for 
example the surveys of Battese (1992), and Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993)). The 
identification of these factors might be of significant use to policy makers attempting to 
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raise average level of farmers' technical efficiency. Variables affecting the ability of the 
manager, like education and experience, farm size, changes in instimtional constraints, 
access to credit, and utilization of extension services are among the factors used to explain 
variation in technical efficiency. 
The first studies estimated the stochastic firontier assuming mean of technical 
inefficiency to be constant among farms and regressed later the estimates of the predictors of 
technical efficiency on farm-specific variables. As Battese and Coeili (1995) argue, the 
assumption of farm-independent mean of technical inefficiency made on the first stage of 
the estimation of the stochastic frontier, is not consistent with the assumptions of the second 
stage when the means are assumed to be functions of farm-specific variables. Thus, the 
simultaneous estimation of inefficiency effects with the stochastic frontier is a technique 
preferred to the two-stage analysis. The models proposed by Huang and Liu (1994) and 
Battese and Coeili (1995) allowed for the simultaneous estimation of both production 
frontier and inefficiency explaining model. 
The Battese and Coeili (1995) model presented later in the text is used in our 
analysis. 
Efficiency of agricuitural production in formerly planned economies 
There have been considerable applications of fi-ontier methods in agriculture (Battese 
1992; Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro, 1993; Coeili, 1995b). However, little research exists on 
the efficiency of agriculture in the formerly planned economies. 
Data have been limited, especially at the farm level, and the work on productivity 
and efficiency in agriculture was first done using country level data (Koopman, 1989; Carter 
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and Zhang, 1994), and regional within-coimtry aggregates (Boyd, 1987, 1988; Brada and 
King, 1993; Hofler and Payne, 1993, 1995; Sotnikov, 1998; Sedik, Truebold, and Amade, 
1999). Recent studies exist that use farm-level data to study production efficiency. Brock 
(1994, 1997) analyzed farm-level data to smdy production efficiency using a "whole farm" 
production fimction. Only a few studies examine farm level technical efficiency of a single 
crop in the formerly planned economies (e.g., Skold and Popov, 1990, 1992; Johnson et al., 
1994; Bayarsaihan, Battese, and CoeUi, 1998). 
In the planned economy setting, in addition to the question of the ability to achieve 
the frontier, the question of willingness to achieve the frontier deserves special interest. The 
incentives of manager and workers to achieve the highest possible production given the 
resources available may be affected by breaking the link of ownership between the farm 
workers and the means of production. 
Within country studies on productivity and efficiency of Socialist agriculture can be 
divided in two groups. One group has addressed the question of whether efficiency of 
collectivist agriculmre is significantly lower than that of the private one. The other group 
has analyzed efficiency of collectivist agriculture without referring to the private one. 
Studies comparing private and collectivist agriculture 
The first group of smdies were carried out for Yugoslavia and Poland, because these 
are the only Socialist countries where socialist and private sectors of agriculture were 
comparable in terms of size and output mix. 
Boyd (1987) compared efficiency of socialist and private sectors using Yugoslavian 
regional data for the period 1956-1979. First, sector production functions were estimated 
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and were found to be different. Next, an aggregate production fiinction was estimated and 
sector intercepts were compared to capture the difference in efficiency. The intercepts were 
higher for the private sector. However, the author argued that different input elasticities and 
different economies of scale make the comparison between the two sectors dependent on 
factor endowments. He concluded that the socialist enterprises can not be called more 
inefficient than the private ones. Similar methodology produced similar results for Poland 
(Boyd, 1988). 
Brada and King (1993) used a linear programming method to compare technical 
efficiency of Poland socialist and private sectors. The sample used for this smdy was that of 
Boyd (1988) consisting of observations on 17 counties over the years 1960-1974. As in the 
previous studies, no differences in the levels of technical efficiency between the two sectors 
were found. However, the dispersion of efficiency levels was found to be smaller for the 
private farms. 
Hofler and Payne (1993, 1995) reexamine Boyd's (1987) work by applying a 
stochastic production firontier model. They find the private sector to be more efficient than 
the cooperative one in two of the three regions of Yugoslavia studied. 
The relatively recent study of Piesse, Thirtle, and Turk (1996) utilize farm-level data 
on 4 cooperative and 12 private dairy farms in Slovenia (former Yugoslavian republic) for 
the years 1974-1990. The non-parametric programming approach and econometric 
approach results were compared. For the econometric method, the production function was 
first estimated using panel data model with varying intercepts and conunon slope 
coefficients. Then the corrected ordinary least squares technique was applied. Both 
approaches showed the private sector to be more technically efficient, and its productivity to 
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grow faster than the cooperative sector. The cooperatives remained more productive 
because private farms were too small. 
Technical efficiency studies on collective agriculture alone 
Skold and Popov (1990) estimated the inefficiency model with a Translog frontier 
production function and half-normal inefficiency term (Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt, 1977) 
separately for 5 crops on a sample of 115 state and collective farms from Stavropol Region, 
Russia, 1986-1988. The average efficiency varied from 0.55 for vegetables to 0.83 for 
grain. 
Skold and Popov (1992) related differences in technical efficiency estimates to farm 
organizational structures, management characteristics, and labor payment methods. The 
inefficiency model with a Cobb-Douglas frontier production function and half-normal 
inefficiency term (Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt, 1977) was estimated separately for 5 crops 
on a sample of 71 state and collective farms from Stavropol Region, Russia, 1986-1987. 
The two-stage approach to the inefficiency explanation was used. 
Skold and Popov (1992) found that collective farms were more efficient than state 
farms. This was explained by the practice of rescuing failing collective farms by the by state 
and converting into state farms. Contrary to expectations, the impact of alternative 
technology programs sought to improve allocation and timing of fertilizer and pesticide use 
was found insignificant. It may be explained that the program increased resource use 
(fertilizer), a change captured in the traditional production function inputs; the improved 
timing of input application turned out to be not as effective in increasing yield, as was the 
increased quantities of inputs applied. Farm organizational structure mattered for grain and 
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sunflower production efficiency only. Years of manager's experience had a positive effect, 
though significant in vegetable production only. No difference in efficiency achieved under 
different payment schemes was revealed, probably because all the forms of labor payments 
gave similar salary levels. 
Bouzaher, Carriquiry, and Jensen (1994) (also reported in Johnson et al., (1994)) 
estimated the inefficiency model with a Cobb-Douglas frontier production fiinction and time 
varying inefficiency term (Battesse and CoeUi, 1992) separately for 4 crops and 3 soil-
climatic zones of Ukraine. The data used came from the collective farm census: 11,440 
farms, 1986-1991. Declining over time technical efficiency was found. The "tails" of the 
farm-level distributions of technical efficiency scores were examined to identify farm 
indicators differing between the most efficient and the least efficient farms. State farms 
turned out to be more efficient that the collective ones. The more efficient farms had more 
processing and subsidiary workers, higher assets value per hectare of agriculmral land, and a 
lower portion of revenue from livestock. 
Brock (1994) applied a Cobb-Douglas "whole farm" production function in the 
analysis of 345 collective and state farms in Volgograd Region, Russia, 1991. An 
inefficiency model with a half-normal inefficiency term (Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt, 1977) 
was tested and rejected in favor of the traditional production function. The author found a 
strong negative effect of land quality on productivity. The unexpected finding was 
explained by ideologically-based output pricing policies that discriminated against farms 
with high quality lands (the composite output of the farm was measured in current rubles). 
State order (measured by the share of output sold to state) was found to have no effect on 
productivity. The author argued that although state order should improve productivity by 
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guaranteeing input supplies, it suppresses realization of local comparative advantage by 
stipulating output mix. 
Brock (1997) used the inefficiency model with a Cobb-Douglas whole farm frontier 
production function and time varying inefficiency term (Battesse and Coelli, 1992) to 
analyze how land quality, access to transportation, and state procurement influence 
collectivist farm performance in Russia. A sample of 173 state and 143 collective farms in 
Volgograd Region, Russia, 1988 - 1990, was used. First, the model was estimated 
separately for six soil-climatic zones. Then the means of efficiency scores were compared 
between two groups of farms to test whether factors of interest affect inefficiency 
(separately for the six zones). The insignificant effect of state order found in the results was 
explained as in Brock (1994). A positive, though insignificant, effect of transport access, as 
measured by whether or not a farm is located near mainline transport links, was attributed to 
poor quality of rural transport system. Insignificant differences in the means of efficiency 
were found between state and collective farms. Efficiency declined with soil quality in two 
zones, and increased with state procurement share in one zone. 
Bayarsaihan, Battese, and Coelli (1998) used a panel of data on 48 Mongolian farms 
over 1976-1989 to smdy the changes in and determinants of efficiency of grain production. 
Two econometric models were used. The inefficiency model with a Translog frontier 
production function and time varying inefficiency term (Battesse and Coelli, 1992) was 
estimated separately for three sub-periods corresponding to different policy regimes. Farm 
technical efficiency was found to decrease significantly over the period 1976-1980, decrease 
slowly over 1981-1985, and increase slowly over the period 1986-1989, result that are 
consistent with the changes in incentive policies. 
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Inefficiency explanatory variables were available for provinces, not individual farms, 
and for 1987-1989 only. These variables were assigned to farms according to the province 
where the farm belonged. The constructed data were used to estimate the inefficiency model 
with a Translog firontier production function and the inefficiency term depending on 
province- and time-specific variables (Battese and Coelli, 1995). The efficiency was 
positively related to the levels of technical education and experience of farm workers, the 
degree of management autonomy, and the amount of Russian technical assistance. 
Sedik, Truebold, and Amade (1999) addressed changes of efficiency over 1991-1995 
with oblast-lQwOil data on coUectivist farm crop production from 74 regions of Russia. Four 
models were estimated. A DEA model with an output oriented measure of efficiency with 
both variable and constant return to scale variations was fit. The stochastic frontier model 
with Cobb-Douglas frontier production function and time varying inefficiency term 
(Battesse and Coelli, 1992), and that with the inefficiency term depending on oblast- and 
time-specific variables (Battese and Coelli, 1995) were considered. The last model was used 
to analyze the factors affecting inefficiency. 
Efficiency decUned with time, especially for the least efficient regions. Movement 
toward concentration of production increased efficiency. The more efficient regions had 
more employees per farm and smaller farms. State procurement increased efficiency, which 
according to the authors, means that state procurement might reduce transaction and search 
costs for farms allowing them to concentrate on production only. Another possible 
explanation, not considered by the authors, is that signing up for state order eased timely 
input acquisition, and this contributed to an increase in farm output. An increase in input 
prices relative to output prices led to improved efficiency, presumably, through 
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encouragement of efficient input use. An increasing share of subsidies in revenues lowered 
efficiency. 
More precipitation led to more efficiency, higher temperatures led to less efficiency. 
Authors reasonably explained this finding as the incidence of drought would show up as 
apparent technical inefficiency. 
The share of value of crops raised privately was negatively related to the efficiency 
of collective sector. The explanation of the authors supports the working hypothesis of the 
previous two chapters of the dissertation. Intentional or de facto provision of inputs to SHP 
production (including labor) increases the amount of crops raised privately and lowers 
availability of the inputs for collective production. The last, in turn, if not reflected in the 
amounts of inputs used up for collective production, shows up as a spurious inefficiency in 
this sector. 
Data 
The data for our analysis come from a random survey of state and collective farms in 
Ukraine during 1989-92 (Carriquiry, 1993). Since little internal restrucmring has occurred 
since this period, the clear advantage of the detailed input and output data reported in 
physical units overweighs the possible disadvantage of using seven year old data. 
The data were collected in 1992 retrospectively for 1989-1991. The survey was 
designed as a random sample of state and collective farms across agro-climatic zones and 
was stratified by farm size. The Ukrainian Instimte for Agrarian Economics (UTAE) 
supervised the administration of the survey. The data were based on farm-kept written 
records that are the source for standard statistical questionnaires filled out at the end of each 
year. Of the original 80 farms surveyed, data for 41 from two administrative regions, the 
Kyivska oblast and Cherkaska oblast of the mixed soil-climatic zone, were complete and 
used for the analysis. The mixed soil-climatic zone has average annual precipitation of 450 
to 600 mm and has predominantly highly favorable black soils. This zone takes up about 
one third of total Ukrainian agricultural land. Comparison of sample means with those of 
the census data confirms that the sample is representative for the mixed soil-climatic zone of 
Ukraine. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 shows changes over 1989-1992 typical for Ukraine's agricultural sector as 
the large coUectivist farms started to downsize. The average farm size in the sample in 1989 
was 2,403 hectares of agricultural land with 384 farm workers, 327 of whom were engaged 
in agriculmral production. 
The average decline in the land holdings of the farms over the period was 7.6%, 
because of obligatory transfer of land to state reserves (see the description of land reform in 
the Introduction). 
The average decline in the total number of farm and agricultural workers was 13% 
and 11%, respectively. The decrease in the working population on the farms can be 
attributed to at least three factors: workers leaving farms to move to cities, retirement, and 
quits to farm privately. 
The migration of working age population from mral to urban areas prevailed in the 
pre-reform Soviet Union for a long time, because Soviet official development policies 
favored industrial urban growth for the expense of agriculture (Bonanno et al., 1993; World 
Table 4.1. General farm-level indicators" 
Indicator Units 1989 1990 1991 1992 Avg. change per 
farm 1989-92 
Aericultural exoerience of manaeer vears 25.6 
(7.4) 
Aericultural land hectares 2403 2350 2236 2196 -7.6% 
(971) (948) (857) (830) (9.6%) 
Total farm workers number 384 376 359 335 -13% 
(123) (121) (118) (120) (10%) 
Agricultural workers number 327 317 305 290 -11% 
(97) (97) (97) (98) (12%) 
Ratio of non-agricultural to total farm number 0.145 0.154 0.146 0.129 -8% 
(0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.050) (26%) 
Agricultural workers per hectare of number 0.143 0.142 0.142 0.137 -3% 
agricultural land (0.033) (0.032) (0.029) (0.030) (15%) 
Share of agricultural land under grains number 0.482 0.484 0.485 0.458 -5% 
(0.053) (0.059) (0.053) (0.056) (10%) 
Pensioners number 369 370 372 373 1% 
(130) (132) (133) (130) (10%) 
Ratio of pensioners to total farm workers number 0.97 0.99 1.05 1.14 17% 
(0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.30) (17%) 
Ratio of non-agricultural to total number 0.047 0.078 0.098 0.196 600% 
farm expenditures (0.045) (0.087) (0.104) (0.155^ (815%) 
"All the indicators reported are average per farm, the numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations 
Source; UIAE survey of Ukrainian farms 
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Bank, 1994). The UIAE (1993) reports specifically that the rural population of the two 
administrative regions represented in the data declined by more than 22% firom 1970 to 
1990/ 
The other possible explanations for the decline in collective sector employment are 
in quits and layoffs due to retirement and shift to private farming. Aggregate Ukrainian 
statistics show virtually unchanged rural population over the years (SCSU, 1997). What do 
those who left do for a living? Most of them are, probably, retirees. According to census 
data, in 1989, some 29% of workers in agriculture were older than fifty (ILO, 1995). Given 
that the official retirement age in Ukraine is 55 for women and 60 for men, it is quite 
possible that a big share of those who left collective farming retired. This explanation is 
consistent with pensioner data in the sample: on average, the number of pensioners per 
worker increased by 17% over the period. 
As for those not retired, private farming is the only alternative to collectivist farm 
employment in rural areas. For families with more than one adult, an employment of one 
member at the collectivist farm might be enough to keep all the benefits of input acquisition, 
while other family members work SHP. 
On average, the share of farm resources devoted to activities other than agricultural 
production declined 8%, as measured by the share of workers not involved in the main 
production. In 1992, about 13% of farm employees were social, maintenance, repair. 
^ As transition developed, the rural out-migration decreased, and even reversed in many parts of the 
former Soviet Union (Mitchnek and Plane, 1995; Wegren, 1995). The researchers convincingly argue that in 
the presence of overall difficulties with food people prefer to have the household plots where at least food can 
be produced. However, since 1991-92 are the first years of reforms, it is likely that better opportunities in 
cities were still attracting younger people from villages during the years covered by our data. 
construction, or processing workers. The share of non-agricultural production expenditures 
in total farm expenditures increased from less than 5% in 1989 to almost 20% in 1992. 
However, because of the complex system of subsidies, bonuses, and other price distortions, 
it is not clear whether there was an increase in this measure in real terms. In addition, a part 
of this increase might be attributed to problems of keeping adequate financial accounting in 
the situation of high inflation. Prices doubled from 1990 to 1991, and increased almost 20 
fold from 1991 to 1992. To avoid the considerable error that might be introduced while 
relying on the data in monetary units, we employ data only in physical units for our analysis. 
Partial productivity indicators 
Table 4.2 shows the grain production and input use based on the survey results. On 
average, total grain production declined by 35% over the four years, although the area under 
grains declined by only 12%. A part of the decline in yield can be attributed to poor weather 
in 1991 and moderately inferior weather in 1992 (prolonged drought during the summer 
combined with high temperatures), although input shortages aggravated the simation. 
Application of inputs changed dramatically, as application of chemicals per hectare went 
down 20%, organic fertilizer per hectare dropped 16%, and labor use per hectare increased 
more than 90% on average over the four years. The decline in the application of chemicals 
must be attributed to sharp increases in the prices of agricultural inputs relative to prices of 
agricultural output. The decrease for organic fertilizer comes from the downsizing of 
livestock operations (Csaki and Lerman, 1997). In this situation, the farms substituted the 
inputs that were readily available (labor and land) for more expensive and relatively scarce 
inputs (chemicals, fertilizer). 
Table 4.2. Partial productivity and input use indicators" 
Indicator Units 1989 1990 1991 1992 Avg. change 
per farm 
Yield tons per 4.27 4.00 2.88 3.18 -25.4% 
hectare (0.79) (0.73) (0.60) (0.74) (8.5%) 
Production tons 4936 4562 3205 3183 -35% 
(2690) (2558) (1796) (1778) (10%) 
Area planted hectares 1173 1149 1104 1020 -12% 
(550) (542) (510) (469) (10%) 
Labor per hectare planted hours 24 27 28 35 93% 
(12) (13) (15) (17) (184%) 
Fertilizer per hectare planted kiloRrams 7603 7624 6598 6385 -16% 
(5952) (5950) (5264) (5556) (23%) 
Chemicals per hectare planted kilograms 6.5 6.3 5.7 5.2 -19% 
(1.5) (1.6) (1.4) (1.4) (15%) 
Fuel per hectare planted liters 83 83 82 82 -0.9% 
(14^ (14) (13) (12) (5,7%) 
"All the indicators reported are average per farm, the numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations 
Source: UIAE survey of Ukrainian farms 
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Labor use per hectare increased on average by 90%, an observation that seemingly 
contradicts the relative decline in collectivist farm labor analyzed in the previous two 
chapters of the dissertation. However, the times considered in the previous two studies and 
the current one are different. The average increase in the labor hours may be spurious, as 
increasing the number of hours has been the only way to increase the farm wage bill in the 
situation of state controlled per hour wages and farm gate output prices.^ We emphasize that 
the labor hours are those reported in the collectivist farm books, and as such may be subject 
to over-reporting. The high variation across the farms in the sample in the change in the 
labor hours per hectare may be an indication of the reporting problems. Because of data 
shortage, the issue is ignored in the present study, but the observations suggest that the 
question of reported versus actually used labor in collectivist farm production needs to be 
examined more directiy in future research. 
The increase in the labor hours may also be genuine, as shortage of other inputs may 
have forced the farms to switch to manual labor wherever possible. The increase in the hours 
in grain production does not imply similar increases in other crop and Uvestock product 
production. Consequentiy, the reported increase in labor use in the sample does not 
contradict the predicted relative decline in the collectivist farm labor hours analyzed in the 
previous two chapters. In any case, we used the best available reported use of labor inputs 
in the current study. 
® The limitations on farm wage fund discussed in the previous chapter do not apply here as the time 
periods considered are different 
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We were surprised to find that the reported diesel fuel used per hectare did not 
change over time, because fuel is the agricultural input that experienced the highest price 
increase (Csaki and Lerman, 1997). The lack of change may reflect the deliberate over-
reporting of fuel use on farm accounts to ensure enough allotment from the state in the 
future. Although Brock (1994) did not find deliberate over-reporting in the farm annual 
accounts, it is not clear whether the author refers to both input utilization and output or to 
the output only. Alternatively, the unchanged fuel use may reflect the adequate provision of 
inputs due to the preferred status of grain production. Since we have no means to check or 
to correct for the possible error in the measurement of this input, at this point we ignore this 
potential problem in estimation. 
Method 
The model that allows for simultaneous estimation of both the parameters of the 
production frontier function and those of the inefficiency effects model is employed for the 
analysis. Battese and Coelli (1995) proposed the model. The inefficiency explanatory 
variables are chosen to track the changes over time and to explain the variation across farms 
by the variation in farm organization, in managerial ability, in access to markets, and in 
availability of resources. 
In this study, a Translog stochastic frontier production function is assumed to be the 
appropriate model for the analysis of the state and collective farm data for the two oblasts. 
The model to be estimated is defined by 
5 5 5 
(4.1) 
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where the subscript, i, indicates the observation for the z-th farm in the survey (/ = 
1,2,. ..,41), and the subscript, t, indicates the observation for the r-th year (t = 1,2,3,4). Y 
represents the logarithm of the total grain production (in metric tons) on the given farm in 
the given year; , (i = 0,1,...,5;7, /: = 1,2,...,5) represent the unknown parameters, 
associated with the explanatory variables in the production function; d<i\ is a dummy 
variable, which has value 1 if f = 3, and value 0 otherwise; and xis {i = 1,2,...,5) represent 
the logarithms of the total amounts of land under grain production (in hectares), labor in 
grain production (in 1,000 hours), organic fertilizer applied for grain production (in 100 
tons), chemicals applied for grain production (in tons), and diesel fuel used in grain 
production (a proxy for machinery services) (in 1,000 liters) respectively. 
The VitS are assumed to be iid N(0, cr^) random errors, independentiy distributed of 
the UitS. The £/,-,s are non-negative random variables, associated with technical inefficiency 
of production, which are assumed to be independently distributed, such that Uu is obtained 
by truncation (at zero) of the normal distribution with variance cr„", and mean, , where the 
mean is defined by 
= ^0 + <^1 inonagw.^ / + 8^dis.^ + 5^ (agw,., / totland.,)-^ 5(4.2) 
where 5 is a (6 x 1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. The variable nonagwi,/ 
totWit is the ratio of the number of workers on the farm that are not involved in agricultural 
production to the total number of the workers on the farm; agei is the age of the given farm 
manager in years; disi is the distance from a given farm to the nearest city in kilometers; 
agWi,/ totlandit is the number of agricultural workers on the farm per hectare of the total 
farm land; and r is the year of observation (r = 1,2,3,4). 
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The nonagw/totw ratio reflects farm organization and measures the extent of the farm 
self-reliance in the maintenance of its productive and social imfrastructure. The higher this 
ratio, the more of the farm labor resources are devoted to facilities construction and 
maintenance, machinery repair, processing, childcare provision, and other non-agricultural 
activities. To some extent, the higher this ratio, the less the farm depends on the state and/or 
on the developing markets for its operation. This variable is expected to have a negative 
effect on the size of the technical inefficiency effects, i.e., as the relative share of 
nonagricultural activities on the farm increases, so does the infrastructure quality on the 
farm, which in turn, increases the technical efficiency of the farming operations. The high 
nonagw/totw ratio could also be thought of as insurance that a farm has against the 
difficulties of the transition period, a time when the old state controlled system of farming 
support had already deteriorated while new private intermediaries had not yet emerged. 
The age variable is included to check whether the younger and, presumably, more 
reform-oriented managers or the older, more experienced ones achieve higher levels of 
technical efficiency. 
The distance to the nearest city is expected to have a negative effect on the technical 
inefficiency as the further the farm is located from the alternative sources of employment, 
the better are the chances of keeping the most productive labor on the farm, and the higher is 
the average quality of labor inputs. 
The agw/totland ratio is included in the model to control for the relative labor 
abundance of the farm; the time variable captures the changes in inefficiency over time. We 
also have included a dummy variable <^91 into the stochastic frontier specification to account 
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for poor weather conditions in 1991. The descriptive statistics of the variables used in 
estimation are presented in Table 4.3. 
The parameters of the model, i.e. the ^'s, the 5's, and the variance parameters 
C7* = gI + <T^ and Y =al / + cr„*), are simultaneously estimated using the method of 
maximum likelihood. We used program FRONTIER 4.1 developed by Coelli (Coelli, 1996) 
that computes the parameter estimates by maximizing a nonlinear function of the unknown 
parameters in the model subject to the constraints. 
Table 4.3. Summary statistics for variables in the stochastic frontier production function ^ 
Variable Units Sample 
Mean 
Sample 
St. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Production tons 3972 2361 1219 18574 
Land hectares 1112 517 268 2850 
Labor 1,000 hours 32 29 6 219 
Fertilizer 100 tons 79 78 14 596 
Chemicals tons 6.6 3.7 1.6 21.4 
Fuel 1,000 liters 93 51 24 285 
Ratio of non-agricultural number 0.143 0.053 0.041 0.317 
to total workers 
Agricultural workers per number per 0.141 0.031 0.081 0.245 
agricultural land hectare 
Distance to city km 35 16 10 85 
Manager's age years 46.9 8.2 30 65 
^41 farms, 4 years, 164 observations in total 
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Results 
Table 4.4 reports maximum likelihood estimation results. Several generalized 
likelihood-ratio tests regarding the stochastic frontier coefficients, inefficiency model, and 
variance parameters, are sunmiarized in Table 4.5. 
Production frontier estimates 
The estimated standard errors of some of the coefficients in the stochastic frontier are 
large relative to their estimates, which indicates that the individual coefficients may not be 
statistically significant. However, the generalized likelihood-ratio test rejects the composite 
hypothesis that second order variables in the Translog model are zero. That means that 
given the assumption of a Translog specification, a Cobb-Douglas function is not an 
adequate representation of the stochastic frontier function. Sufficient conditions for strict 
quasi-concavity of the frontier production function at the data means are not satisfied. We 
considered imposing concavity of the function by assuming the Cobb-Douglas functional 
form. However, since our data rejected this functional form, we went with a more flexible 
Translog functional form. 
Using the maximum-likelihood estimates for the parameters of the frontier, the 
elasticities of frontier output with respect to land, labor, organic fertilizer, chemicals, and 
fuel, were estimated at the means of the input variables to be 0.76, 0.13,0.08, 0.05, and 
0.02, respectively. The results of most of the known studies on efficiency of agriculture in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are not strictly comparable with ours, because 
the inefficiency models used in these studies are not for grain, but for an aggregate farm 
output (either for the aggregate "crops", or for the "whole farm" production function). 
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Table 4.4. Maximum-likelihood estimates for parameters of the stochastic frontier 
Variable Parameter Estimate St. Error of Estimator ^ 
Stochastic Frontier 
Constant Po 14.4 1.5 
Year 1991 Dummy d9l -0.187 0.029 
In (land) Pi -7.25 0.72 
In (labor) P2 0.03 0.88 
In (fertilizer) P3 0.01 1.02 
In (chemicals) P4 0.19 0.95 
In (fuel) P5 7.23 0.89 
(In (land))- Pu 1.49 0.19 
(In Gabor))" P22 0.010 0.035 
(In (fertilizer))" P33 -0.048 0.040 
(In (chemicals))^ P44 -0.181 0.097 
an (fuel))^ P55 1.03 0.27 
In (land) x InQabor) P12 -0.01 0.24 
In (land) x In(fertLlizer) Pl3 -0.17 0-29 
In (land) x In(chemicals) Pl4 -0.20 0.29 
In (land) x In(fuel) Pl5 -2.59 0-39 
In (labor) x In(fertilizer) P23 0.084 0.073 
In (labor) x In(chemicals) P24 0.018 0.091 
In (labor) x In(fuel) P25 -0.06 0.19 
In (fertilizer) x In(chemicals) P34 0-06 0.14 
In (fertilizer) x In(fiiel) 335 0.27 0-20 
In (chemicals) x In(fuel) p45 0.35 0-25 
Inefficiency Model 
Constant 5o 0.72 0.14 
Non-ag./Total Workers 5i -0.71 0-32 
Age Ss -0.0031 0-0018 
Distance to City 53 -0.0017 0.0011 
Ag.Workers/Total Land 52 -2.40 0.58 
Year 54 0.106 0.014 
Variance Parameters 
0.0155 0.0022 
Y 1.0000 0.0010 
In (Likelihood) 124.70 
^The standard errors for the estimators are obtained by the computer program Frontier 4.1; 
they are correct to two significant digits 
Table 4.5. Generalized-likelihood-ratio tests" 
Null Hypothesis Meaning of Hypothesis In (Ho) X D.F. Critical 
Value 
Decision 
Stochastic Frontier 
Ho: Pij = 0 Frontier is of Cobb-Douglas form 107.68 26.97 15 25,00 Reject Ho 
Ho: P, = P ij = 0 Var./a/irf does not affect stochastic frontier 112.90 23.60 6 12.59 Reject Ho 
HQ: p2 = p 2j = 0 War.labordoes not affect stochastic frontier 110.63 28.13 6 12.59 Reject Ho 
Ho: Ps = P 3j = 0 War.fertilizer does not affect stochastic frontier 113.89 21.61 6 12.59 Reject Ho 
Ho:P4 = P4j = 0 Var,chemicals does not affect stochastic frontier 109.28 30.84 6 12.59 Reject Ho 
Ho: p5 = P5j = 0 Vox.fuel does not affect stochastic frontier 117.73 13.94 6 12.59 Reject Ho 
"The generalized likelihood-ratio statistic is computed as A = -2log[L(//o)/L(//,)], where L(Ho) and L(Hi) are the likelihood 
functions evaluated at the restricted and unrestricted maximum-likelihood estimator for the parameters of the model. If the 
null hypothesis, HO, is true, and does not involve y = 0, then the statistic has approximately chi-squared distribution with 
parameter equal to the number of restrictions imposed by Hq. If a null hypotheses includes y = 0, then, since by its definition 
has y to be non-negative, the statistic has asymptotically a mixed chi-squared distribution (Coelli, 1995a). Koddle and Palm 
(1986) provide critical values for the statistics in such tests. 
^The critical values conespond to 5 percent level of significance 
Table 4.5. (Continued) 
Null Hypothesis Meaning of Hypothesis hi (Ho) D.F. Critical Decision 
Value 
Inefficiency Model 
Ho: Y = 8() = Si Inefficiency effects are absent from 
=  . . = 8 4  =  8 5  =  0 the model 
Hoi 81 =82=83 
= 84 = 85 = 0 
H„: 8, = 0 
Ho: 82 = 0 
Ho; 83 = 0 
Ho: 84 = 0 
Ho: 85 = 0 
Ho:Y = 0 
Inefficiency effects are not a linear 
function of the explanatory variables 
nonogw/tolwdoes not affect 
inefficiency linearly 
age does not affect inefficiency 
linearly 
dis does not affect inefficiency 
linearly 
agw/totland does not affect 
inefficiency linearly 
Inefficiency does not change 
linearly with time 
Inefficiency effects are not 
stochastic 
72.81 
74.79 
121.81 
1 2 1 . 1 6  
121.90 
116.20 
91.26 
120.39 
103.77 
99.81 
5.77 
7.08 
5.60 
17.00 
66.87 
8.61 
7 
5 
13.40 
11.07 
3.84 
3.84 
3.84 
3.84 
3.84 
5.14 
Reject HO 
Reject Ho 
Reject Ho 
Reject Ho 
Reject Ho 
Reject Ho 
Reject Ho 
Reject Ho 
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In comparison with available grain production efficiency analysis, our land elasticity 
is much larger than the ones obtained for the Stavropol region of Russia, 1986-1988, by 
Skold and Popov (1990, 1992), and for Mongolia, 1986-1989, by Bayarsaihan, Battese, and 
Coelli (1998). Their estimates were in the range of 0.21-0.34. At the same time, our land 
elasticity is close to the value 0.71 found by Johnson et al.(1994) for Ukraine, who used a 
different model and relied on farm-level data in rubles for several inputs for the years 1986-
1991. Wyzan (1981) found the land elasticity to be 0.62 when estimating a grain production 
function for the whole USSR with republic-level aggregated data for 1960-1976. 
The estimated labor elasticity 0.13 falls in the range from 0.040 to 0.223 reported in 
the grain smdies mentioned above. In addition, labor elasticities in this range were reported 
in many of the efficiency studies that aggregated output. Among others, Hofler and Payne 
(1995) found similar elasticities for Yugoslavia, 1961-1979; Brock (1994) - for Russia, 
1991; Carter and Zhang (1994) - for nine centrally planned economies, 1965-1989. The 
other input data (organic fertilizer, chemicals, and fuel) were not available in the previous 
grain efficiency studies. 
The relatively small elasticities for inputs other than land prompted us to check 
whether each of the input variables has a non-zero impact on the frontier function. Because 
the generalized likelihood-ratio tests of the hypotheses are preferred to the asymptotic t-tests 
in maximum likelihood estimation, the hypotheses that the coefficients of the corresponding 
input variables are zero, for each input variable separately, were tested. The tests were 
rejected as reported in Table 4.5, which means that the impact of each of the input variables 
on the frontier production function is statistically significant. The returns to scale parameter 
was found to be 1.03, implying constant returns to scale for grain production on the state and 
I 
I 
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collective farms. This result is consistent with earlier studies for Ukraine (Johnson et al., 
1994) and Russia (Skold and Popov, 1990, 1992). 
(In)efficiency model estimates 
The major interest of our study is the inefficiency model. Figure 4.1 provides 
frequency distributions of the efficiency estimates. The average technical efficiency in the 
sample was estimated as 0.82,0.76,0.68, and 0.60 for the four years of data (1989-92), 
respectively. Estimates in this range are found in earlier studies of inefficiency in 
agricultural production (Battese (1992), Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993)). 
The null hypothesis that inefficiency effects are absent from the model is strongly 
rejected at the 5% level of significance, and so is the null hypotheses that the explanatory 
variables in the model for the technical inefficiency effects have zero coefficients. The null 
hypotheses that individual effects of the explanatory variables in the model for the technical 
inefficiency effects are zeros were tested as well. The results presented in Table 4.5 show 
that all five null hypotheses were rejected. 
The estimated coefficient of year is positive which means that technical efficiency 
declined over time, a result that is consistent with earlier findings obtained with a different 
model and a different Ukrainian farm data set (Johnson et al., 1994). The results illustrate 
that the economic reforms are costly in terms of technical efficiency, probably because the 
old production ties, like the state input distribution system, severely deteriorated with the 
start of economic reforms, while new production intermediaries have not yet emerged. In 
this situation, the decline in the precision of timing of input application due to problems of 
availability is not captured by the quantities of inputs applied to production, and this may 
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Figure 4.1. Frequency distribution of technical efficiency by years 
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have resulted in the estimated negative effect of the coefficient of year on efficiency. 
The number of agricultural workers per hectare was found to have positive effect on 
technical efficiency, which suggests that abundance of labor resources for production is 
important for achieving effective utilization of inputs. The model employed by Johnson et 
al. (1994) did not estimate the impact of farm-specific variables on inefficiency 
simultaneously with estimation of the stochastic frontier. However, a similar relationship 
was found by comparing the means of the number of agricultural workers per hectare for the 
fifty least and fifty most efficient farms (the number of farms in the sample was 3,798). 
The coefficient of the share of non-agricultural workers in the total number of farm 
workers is negative, and indicates that technical inefficiency in grain production decreases 
with an increase of this share, and, presumably, with an increase in the quality of the farm 
infrastructure. This result suggests that in the absence of an adequate market environment, 
the agricultural production units that invest relatively more (in terms of labor force) into 
farm infrastrucmre achieve higher levels of technical efficiency in agriculmral production. 
Unfortunately, the data used do not discriminate among different types of farm non-
agricultural production activities. These activities might mean investment into other 
production (eg., production facilities construction, processing, marketing), or improvement 
in farm living conditions (eg., catering, child care provision, road maintenance). Improved 
farm living conditions are likely to increase the quality of available labor resources directly 
as workers can get better recreation and rest, and are pushed into less shirking and 
absenteeism caused by health and child care problems. 
The average quality of labor resources also may be affected indirectly through 
prevention of quits of productive workers. The potential loss of farm-provided social 
Il l 
benefits is considered as one of the main reasons for a farm employee's decision to remain 
on the coUectivist farm as opposed to starting his or her own private farm (Lerman, Brooks, 
and Csaki, 1994). Hence, investment into farm social infrastructure might be a valuable tool 
used by farm managers to retain workers from leaving the farms. The decrease in the 
number of workers might be undesirable because those who leave, on average, possess 
above average skills, both general and agriculture-specific. According to official statistics, 
the rural share of the total working age population has remained stable, around 28%, over 
the past years; therefore the major alternative to the former state or collective farm 
employment seems to be private farming. The finding of Csaki and Lerman (1997), that 
private farmers are on average better educated than coUectivist farm employees suggests that 
departure of farm workers toward private fanning lowers the average level of education of 
coUectivist farm workers. Thus, workers' leaving may have led to lower productivity in 
coUectivist farms as education and experience became increasingly important in the success 
of adjustment to rapidly changing economic environment of Ukraine. 
Independently of whether the increase in the share of farm non-agricultural 
production activities means more production or social workers, the increase in the share 
means also that the farm-provided jobs not only enhance farm production and/or general 
infrastructure, but also lead to additional income for the rural population. The importance of 
this additional income is made all the more important by the shrinking scale of main 
production as outlined above, and consequentiy, lower farm revenues and wage bill. The 
additional non-agricultural production jobs might have provided greater income security for 
farm famiUes thus reducing further the possibiUty of leaving coUectivist farms. In sum, the 
farm's non-agricultural production activities may have made coUectivist fanns more 
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attractive place for living, and in this way kept the average skill level of workers from 
declining^ 
The effect of the age of the manager on technical efficiency was estimated to be 
positive; i.e., other things equal, the older the manager is, the less technical inefficiency the 
farm displayed. This is consistent with the results of Skold and Popov (1992), who found a 
similar, though weak, relationship between manager's experience and technical efficiency in 
grain production for a sample of 136 Russian farms observed over the years 1986-87. A 
similar positive impact of manager's experience on technical efficiency have been found in 
smdies on Third World agriculture (see the survey of Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993)). 
These findings can be explained by the manager's ability to deal with disequlibria in 
the sense described by Schultz (1975). The estimation results suggest, then, that those more 
experienced managers were more up to the task of achieving technical efficiency. The 
improvement of ability to avoid improvident decisions with experience may have been 
captured in the positive relationship found between manager's age and technical efficiency. 
The coefficient of distance to the nearest city was found to be negative, i.e. ceteris 
paribus, the farms located further from the cities are less technically inefficient (i.e., more 
efficient). One interpretation is that the advantage in location may have allowed the farms 
to compete better with cities for workers. More energetic workers from rural farms located 
closer to cities could commute to jobs in these cities, lowering the average skill/effort level 
^ Following this argument, another explanatory variable of inefficiency, the number of agricultural 
workers per hectare, captures a part of the effect of the share of non-agricultural workers in the total number of 
farm workers on inefficiency. Further separation of the effects of these two explanatory variables on technical 
inefficiency would require specification of a labor mobility model. The data available are not able to support 
this analysis. 
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of the available labor on these farms. In addition, the farms located closer to cities had 
easier access to the less productive (in agricultural tasks) city workers and students recruited 
for harvest time. In this way, relative efficiency would be related to the distance from the 
city through its effect on the quality of the productive labor of the farm even if workers do 
not leave the rural area permanently. Unfortunately, lack of additional data on commuters 
and temporary urban labor does not allow us to investigate this argument further and the 
explanation offered remains only a conjecture. 
The estimate for the variance parameter, y , is estimated to be close to one. If this 
parameter is zero, then is zero, and the model reduces to a traditional production fiinction 
with the explanatory variables (nonagw/totw, age, dis, agw/totland, and, t) aU included in the 
production function. This would mean that inefficiency effects are not stochastic. The last 
null hypothesis, Hq: y =0, which specifies that the explanatory variables in the model for the 
technical inefficiency effects are not stochastic, is rejected by the data.' 
Conclusions 
Grain production and input use data in physical units together with overall farm 
operations information were used to estimate a stochastic frontier model in which 
inefficiency effects are modeled as a function of farm-specific variables and time. The 
magnimdes of the production function and efficiency estimates do not differ much from 
® An estimated 160,000 workers commuted to the city of Kyiv from nearby rural communities at the 
beginning of the 1990s (Bohdan, 1992). 
' In this case, the parameter 5q  is not identified, and consequentiy, the number of degrees of freedom 
for the test statistic is two. 
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other findings obtained for the formerly planned economies with different models and 
different data sets. Our results indicate that the traditional production function model is 
likely to be inadequate for the farm-level analysis of grain production. 
The results illustrate that the process of transformation of Ukrainian agriculture 
started in 1990 is cosdy in terms of technical efficiency; efficiency declined over the 1989-
1992 period. The relative abundance of labor and distance to a nearest city were both found 
to have a positive effect on technical efficiency. Older, and consequendy, more experienced 
managers were found to be able to achieve higher levels of technical efficiency, a result, that 
is consistent with Schultz (1975)' hj^othesis on the value of the improving with experience 
ability to deal with disequilibria. 
It must be noted, that the ability to deal with disequilibria might even better be 
revealed in the analysis of allocative efficiency, where the latter is defined as the ability of a 
farm to use the inputs in optimal proportions corresponding to their respective prices. Lack 
of financial data precludes us from exploring this problem. The estimation suggests that 
investments of farm labor resources in infrastrucmre also improved technical efficiency. 
The results illustrate that the introduction of reforms has not immediately reversed 
the decline in efficiency in Ukraine's agriculture. Moreover, the more efficient farms were 
found to be less market-oriented, a result associated with maintenance of farm infrastructure. 
Lack of data prevented us from separating the effects of different types of farm non-
agricultural activities on technical efficiency. Further research is needed on how farm 
organization affects agricultural production efficiency in Ukraine, and other countries in 
economic transition. The results highlight the importance of analysis of production at the 
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farm level because production efficiency varies across farms and this should be taken into 
account for both research and policy considerations. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
The three dissertation essays investigated productivity changes in post-Soviet 
primary agriculture. The first two studies examined the causes and impact of reallocation of 
labor between the collective and subsidiary plot sectors. The third study analyzed technical 
efficiency of former collective and state farms in grain production at the early stages of the 
reforms. 
The findings obtained help to explain dramatic changes observed in the productivity 
of the collective and subsidiary plot sectors and attribute part of the change to rational labor 
supply behavior of households that had access to the plots. Decline in wages, uncertainty in 
wages, decreased probability of receiving wages, and increased availability of land for 
subsidiary fanning are all consistent with the relative increase of labor hours in subsidiary 
farming at the expense of collective farming hours. Similarly, decline and increased 
uncertainty in government-provided social benefits are consistent with increased 
involvement of pensioner households in subsidiary subsistence farming. 
Econometric analysis showed that a large portion of the variation in the growth of 
the subsidiary farming share in gross agricultural output among Ukrainian regions can be 
explained by variations in the rate of the decline of agricultural wages, urban-rural 
composition of population, rural land availability, and application of inputs other than land 
and labor. 
Technical efficiency of the former collective and state farms was studied using 
stochastic production frontier analysis. The results of estimation suggest that technical 
efficiency declined over 1989-1992. The technical efficiency was found to be affected by 
workforce composition of the farms and several human capital factors. 
117 
The issues of agricultural productivity and labor are critical policy issues in 
contemporary Ukraine, Russia, and some other former Soviet Union republics. Currently, 
the reforms in Ukraine are at a standstill stage. There is a great need for research to guide 
policymakers in understanding the reasons for and consequences of the current deadlock and 
to design policies to resume progress in reforms. Our results help in understanding 
economic reasons behind the current situation. The findings of the first two studies 
identified causes of reallocation of labor to subsidiary household plots, a sector that is not 
fiilly supported by instimtional reforms. The findings of the third study point to human 
capital factors as important determinants of technical efficiency achieved in the collective 
sector of agriculture. The results highlight the importance of labor response considerations 
when designing policies to support transition agriculture. 
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APPENDIX: DETAILS OF PROOFS 
A.I. Proof of Proposition 2.2 
The statement (i) is proven by checking the second order conditions at (Jf*, 
Statements (ii) and (iii) are proven by applying standard comparative static techniques to the 
first order conditions at the interior maximum. 
With the discretely distributed W, (2.3) is equivalent to 
max p-Uiwh"+f{h'',m),T-h'-h'')+{\-p)-u(f{h'',m),T-h''-h'') (A.I) h''>0. h'>0 / V  I 
The first order necessary conditions for an interior maximum (2.4) and (2.5) take the 
form 
= p • ir/i - u:}+ (1 - p) • - u: }= o, (A.2) 
= (A.3) 
Here U* =uXwh'  + f(h ' ' ,m),T-h'  -h") ,  U; = C/.(/(/z^m), T-/i" -h") ,  i=l ,2.  
For ease of presentation, we suppress the arguments of the function/in the 
derivations to follow. 
Note, that under the assumptions of the Proposition, (2.6) takes a transparent form 
- r u • / ,  = pw ' ^ , I.e. f .<w at the optmium. 
pUi +(l-p)Ui 
A sufficient second order condition for an interior maximum is that the matrix of 
second derivatives of the expected utility. 
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D = 
d^Eim d^E[U] 
dh"^ 
d'E\U] 
dh'dh" 
dh^dh" 
a^E[£/] 
dh c2 
(A.4) 
is negative definite at (I f*,  h '^ ' ) .  
The second derivatives of expected utility evaluated at h'^*) are given by 
= P • - 2u:,f, + u;,}+ (1 - p) • •^-/r - 2U-J, + ] 
ah'' 
d-E[m 
dh 
+ fn{pu:+a-P)u;} 
- 2u:^w+u:^}+ a-p)- u; 
1^^ = P • - u:._ (w+/,)+c/i }+ (1 - p) • {- £/-/. + } 
Here U; .^wh' + f^h"),!-h'-h"), C/" ^Uyif ih- ' IT -  h'-h") ,  i j=l ,2.  
The derivative ^ is negative, because the terms in the first two curly brackets 
oh^ 
are negative by the assumption (S.2*), and the third additive term is negative by (S.3) and 
(S.l). Similarly, because of (S.2*), the derivative ^ is also negative. Consequently, 
oh^" 
to ensure that the second order conditions are satisfied, it remains to show that dtXJ(D) is 
positive, where D is given by (A.4). 
Calculation of detCDj: 
det(£>) a^EC/ d^'EU 
' dh"-
^ d^EU ^ 
dh'dh' 
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Substituting the expressions for the derivatives, collecting the terms with///, and 
then collecting the remaining terms with p^, (1-pf, and p(l-p), we obtain 
det(D) = /„{pt/r+(1 -
+ p ' -  -  2 u ; , u : . w f ,  i w + f o + u ; , u ^  (w-+/f) 
+ ( w + / , ) + uw:^  \ 
-p--{u: ,u:yf:  +2wf,+f^)^u:j j :^  
+2c/r.t/*/r -4£/r3t /*/ ,}  
+  ( 1  -  p ) -  •  { -  2 c / - t / - /  +  }  
- a - p ) - - {  u : . u ; j c  -  2£/-i/-/ + £/^£/- } 
+po.-p)-{ {w-f- - 2u:,u;y-f, + f/r.t/-
+4c/,: t / -w/ ,  -2U:j j; j ,  +u:j j; j ,  
- p ( i - p ) - { -  2 u ; , u ; . w f ;  +  2 u : , u ; _ . w f ,  +  2 u : j u ; j ,  ( w + / , )  
-2£/i;c/-(vv+/,)-2t^^£/-/, +2u:jj;,} 
Simplifying, we get 
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ciet(D) = [f,,\pU: + (1 -
+ P(i - P) • { (w - /, + w+ fx-u:jJn 
-  2wffu:M- - 2/,wcw - /, )£/rif/r2+2/, (w - /, )c/r2t^r21 i 
Every additive term in the last expression is positive: the term with/// is positive 
because///<0 by (S.3), the sum in the square brackets is positive by (S.l), and the second 
derivative is negative as proven above. The terms with and (1-pf are positive because 
the expressions in the square brackets are positive by (S.2*). The term with p( 1-p) is 
positive because every additive term there is positive by (S.2*) and//<w. Thus, detfD) is 
positive, and statement (i) is proven. 
To derive the impact of changes in the exogenous variable p  on the optimal f f *  and 
,c« u • dh'' ... . ... 
n , that is, ——, ——, we apply standard comparaave staacs techniques: 
op op 
'd-E[U] 3-E[U] 
dh'Sh' 
d-E[U] d^E[U] 
dh''dh' 
1 »
 
r
o
 
d^'ElU] 
dp dh^'dp 
dh"" d-E[U] 
.  ^P .  dh'dp 
(A.5) 
where all the second derivatives are evaluated at (ff*, h'^*). 
Differentiating with respect to p and using the first order conditions. 
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.... 1 
M=:;r/.-ui  -£/,-/.-u;  =1^ -£/."/,} 
To find the effect of changes in p on hf ' ,  we solve (A.5) for dh' 
dp 
dh''' _ det(A) 
dp det(D) 
where 
(A.6) 
det(A) = det 
a-ELc/] d-Elui" 
dh'dp dU'dh" d-E\.m 
a^£[c/] d^E[U] dh''dp 
dh'dp dh'-
d-E[U] d-E[U] 
dhW ' dh'dp 
Substituting the expressions for the derivatives and collecting the terms with , we 
obtain 
det( A) = - • {U; \piw-f ,  w - C/; }+ (I - p)/,C/- ] 
P 
-u;f , \pyv(]u: ,w-u;.)^pu:_.+{x-pw;.-pu:^w)\  } 
= - • {u; f ,  \pu :.w- pu:_ .  - (I - p)u;^]+ u;u;, (i -  p)f ,  
p 
The two additive terms in the first line of the last expression are both positive by 
(S.l), (S.2*), (S.3). The term in the curly brackets in the second line is negative by (S.2*). 
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To sign the term in the square brackets, we use the following expression obtained by 
subtracting (A.3) multiplied by (fi+kw)/h from (A.2) multiplied by w: 
u:f,w = (w - /, + u; J 
With the last expression, 
(1-/?) 
dh" 
and det(A) > 0. Then, by (A.6), ——< 0, and statement (ii) is proven. 
dp 
To sign the effect of changes in p on the optimal/z", we solve (A.5) for 
dh"^ __ det{B) 
dp det(D)' 
where 
dh' 
dp 
(A.7) 
det(5) = det 
d^'ElU] d-E[U] 
dh"- dh^dp 
d^E[U] d-E[m 
dh'dh" dh'^dp 
d-E[U] d-E[U] _ d-EjU] d'E[U] 
dh"-  '  dh'dp dh'dh" '  dh'dp 
Substimting the expressions for the derivatives and collecting the terms with and 
f\' obtain 
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det(s)=i- (£/; • (a - p)/,^,-./, -^,'2}+ fu\pu: + {I - p)£/rB 
P  
- u;f^  • (pu;. + (1 - p)£/r2)+u:f, {put, -f- (1 - pwi,) 
< 0  
Bh^ by the same token as for det(A). Then, by (A.7), —— > 0, and statement (iii) is proven. 
d p  
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2.3 
The solution to (2.8) satisfies the following first-order necessary condition; 
^|^ = £b,/,(;^^/n)-^/J = 0, (A.8) 
ah'^ 
or 
From (S.4p), - (UyYyUy - {Uyy )*) < 0, or UyyY > 0. Then, by the Jensen's 
inequality, 
E [ U y { p  +  f ( h '',m) , T - h ' ' ) ]  >  U y { E [ p ] + f ( h '',m) , T - h ' ' )  
In addition, (S.4p) imply - (Uyy,Uy - UyyUyi) = 0, or Uyyj < 0, and by the Jensen's 
inequality, 
E ^ X p  +  f { h ' ' , m X T - h ' ' ) {  <  u X E i P l ^ f i h ^ m X T - h " ) .  
Thus, for any h'', 
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Ep.iP + fih'.mXT-h'l ^  U,(eiP]+m'.m),T-h')  
E\lJy[P + f(.h',m).T-h')\ Uy[E[P]-t-f(.h',m),T-h') 
Consider 
„_, ,_U , {E[P]+fih\m ) .T - h ' )  
Epy{P + /(h ' .m).r-A')l'  Uy [E[p]+f( .h ' .m).T-h')  
Then (A. 10) means that for any h'', 
Wuncih") < Wcenih"). (A.ll) 
The assumptions of the Proposition imply that (h'') is an increasing function 
ofh":  
dh" Ul ' 
By the definition of h''"and h''", 
Mh"") = Wcrr^h""). (A.13) 
To finish the proof, suppose that the statement of the proposition is not true. We will 
show that this supposition leads to a contradiction. Thus, suppose 
h"' < h"". (A. 14) 
Then 
lS3p) (A.I3) (A.12). (A.I4) (A.U) 
/.(/z"*) > /.(/z"") = > yf^ih'"),U. 
fiih''') > Wunc^h'''), a result, that obviously contradicts (A.13). The contradiction 
achieved means that the supposition (A. 14) is wrong, and the statement of the Proposition is 
proven. 
126 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2.4 
A mean-preserving spread (e.g., Sandmo, 1971) amounts to introduction of two shift 
parameters, one multiplicative and one additive. That is, P is replaced by yP + 0 so that 
dE\yP + 0] = 0, i.e. = £[P]. The effect of the mean-preserving spread is then 
dy 
assessed by evaluating —— at 7 = 1, 0=0. 
dy 
By applying standard comparative statics techniques to the first-order conditions 
(A.8), 
d -E[u]  
dh"' dh^dy 
w = -Ym-
dh"-
where the second derivatives are evaluated at  .  The derivatives are given by 
d-E[u]  
dh 
d~E\u] 
dh''dy 
The covariance is positive, because 
J = £[(/„/,--2£/„/,+£/„+t/,/„] < 0, 
= E[{U„f , -U„tP-E[P]) ]  = Cov\u„f, - U „ , p ] .  
0 
~ , and t/yyy > 0, U [YY <0 ,  
dh''* 
as shown in the proof of the Proposition 2.3. Then, by (A. 15), > 0, and the 
dy 
Proposition is proven. 
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A.4. Proof of Proposition 3.1 
Applying standard comparative statics techniques. 
d'U d'U 'dh*' d'U 
dh' dhdk d w  dhdW 
d'U d'U d k *  d'U 
dkdh 1 
ro 
. d W .  d k d W ,  
where all the second derivatives are evaluated zi(h*, k*y. 
dk 
^:r = h-^n^'-'2-Un^ + U^}, 
=/z(^ + l){£/„W5r.-£/,,(W + /,) + £/„}= 
dhdk h dk' 
1 ^  =  « :  + +  U „  } +  ( / , / „ =  
(A.16) 
k + l d^u 
h dhdk 
+ t^./u 
d ~ U  
dhdW 
d'U 
dkdW 
=  k { k  + l)/z(£/„W - i/i2) + U , k , 
= kh'(]U^yV -U, ,J  + U^h .  
d^U The derivative , is negative, because the term in the curly brackets is negative by 
dk' 
3"£/ 
the assumption (S.2**). The derivative is negative as it is proportional to —r-. 
dhdk dk 
d ' U .  d'U . Finally, -r-^is negative because —5- is negative, and the assumption (S.3**) implies 
dh dk 
diminishing marginal return to labor in SHP production. 
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d k *  Solving (A. 16) for —— yields 
dk det(5) 
dW det(Z>) 
where 
det(£)) = det 
det(5) = det 
dW 
d^U d^U 
dh- dhdk 
d^U d-u  
Jdkdh d k -  J 
' d ^ U  d^U 
dh" dhdW 
d^U d-u  
.dhdk dkdW 
d-u  d~U 
dh-  '  dk-
^  d-u  
dkdh 
d~U d^U d-u  d-u  
dh' dkdW dhdk dhdW 
(A.17) 
Since the det(D) is evaluated at the utility-maximizing point (h*, k*), the second 
order necessary conditions imply det(D) > 0. However, assumptions (S.l), (S.2**), and 
(S.3**) ensure a strict inequality: 
det(Z)) = { k  +  l f  d - u  
h'  dk  T + UJn 
d-u  ( / t  +  l ) -
d k - h' 
^ d-u  ^  
dk-
=£/,/„0->o 
Substituting the expressions for the derivatives, we obtain 
129 
1 •a2rr ^ 
det(5) = it + 1 d^U 
h dhdk 
d^U 
^^{U,,W-U,^)  + U,h} 
J 
dhdk 
\k(Jc + l)hp^  ,W-U,^ )+U,k} 
=u,U,kh-(iJ,,w-u,,)+uj,,h*^\ 
Note that the equation (2.2) is still valid when the parameters { h , k )  replace the pair 
{h^,h''). To see that, subtract (3.2) multiplied by h from (3.3) multiplied by (it +1). 
cc — \ Combining assumption (S.3**) with (2.2), we obtain /,, = W. Then 
h 
det(5) = £/,{(^7,iW - ) W 7 i ( l  +  c o t )  + 1 / ,  ( a  -  1)W + h(k + - U,.W)]. 
Since every additive term in the last expression is negative, det(5) < 0. Then, by 
(A.17).|^>0. 
A.5. Derivation of relationship (3.7) 
Denote 
- SHP time by rural residents in 1991, 
- SHP time by urban residents in 1991, 
H° - collective agricultural production time (by rural residents) in 1991. 
Similarly, 
- SHP time by rural residents in 1996, 
- SHP time by urban residents in 1996, 
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Hi - collective agricultural production time (by rural residents) in 1996. 
Then, by definition. 
A log 
H .  
= log 
( H .  \ f  H[ '- \ -Hf "l 
H. 1996 
= log H ' ^ ' +  H I ' +  H i  
H. H ^ + H f  
[ " •  I99I ^  H^ + Hf + H° \ ^ J C J 
(A. 18) 
We use the Taylor series approximation to expand the exponent of the last log term 
in (A. 18) as a function of two variables, ), around the point {HF = 0, HF = o): 
//:'+H ul H '  
H:'+H":+H\ H:' + Hi 
h:° + H uO H  rO 
M, (A. 19) 
HrO ^  ^ uO ^  f jo 
where 
M  =  I  +  
Given low labor mobility in Ukraine, and virmally unchanged rural population over 
the years 1991-1996, we may assume 
Then, 
M  =  H  
uO 
H : ° + H °  
' h : °  +  H °  
H  uO H ' . ' H f  H? (A.20) 
The term in the curly brackets is positive, because it is equal to 
^ + positive terms] , 
HfH^H'J" 
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and the difference Hf — H"° is positive as rural involvement into SHP production was 
higher than that of urban population in 1991. 
The term in the round brackets of (A.20) is the ratio of urban SHP labor to total 
agricultural labor in 1991. It varies positively with the share of urban population in the total 
working age population of an oblast. Thus, the term M can be thought of as a decreasing 
function of the share of rural residents in the total working age population of an oblast. 
Finally, combining (A. 18) and (A. 19), we obtain 
Alog^ = A log + log(M) 
n J n ^ + n ^ 
=  A l O g — +  YiSrurall 
where is the share of rural residents in the working age population, and is a 
decreasing function of its argument. 
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